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RECONSIDERING EFFICIENT TORT RULES
FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE CASE OF
SINGLE ACTIVITY ACCIDENTS
JENNIFER

H.

ARLEN*

INTRODUCTION

Despite the expenditure of considerable effort, scholars have
been unable to develop tort rules to govern serious physical
injuries to strangers that satisfy the Pareto criterion1 without
resorting to theoretical devices that appear unrealistic even in
the rarefied atmosphere of economic models. An analysis of single
activity accidents 2 demonstrates that expanding the economic
model of accident law to reflect the reciprocal nature of the risks
that the participants in such activities impose on each other
enables the design of tort rules for the resulting physical injuries
that satisfy the Pareto criterion without resort to unrealistic
theoretical devices. Because most tortious accidents result from
bilateral risks,3 the present analysis indicates the need for a
fundamental revision of the basic economic model of accident law.
Analysis of the tort system under the Pareto criterion presents
two issues: the first is whether the introduction of a tort rule is
an "improvement" over a system in which no tort rules exist;
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1. Throughout this Article, a tort rule satisfies the "Pareto criterion" if it is both
"Pareto superior" to a system of purely voluntary transactions and "Pareto efficient," as
those terms are defined below.
2. This category includes automobile accidents, the primary source of tort claims for
serious permanent injury and death in this country. P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 9 (1988).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21, 97-100.
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the second is whether a tort rule is Pareto efficient. The interference with a system of purely private transactions associated
with the introduction of a tort rule is an improvement under the
Pareto criterion if the tort rule is Pareto superior to the system
of purely voluntary transactions in that the rule increases the
utility of at least one person and does not make anyone else
worse off than he would be otherwise. A tort rule is Pareto
efficient if improvement on the rule is not possible in that there
is no possible change in the rule, and thus in the allocation of
resources, that will make someone better off without making
someone else worse off.4 This Article refers to tort rules that
are both Pareto superior and Pareto efficient as "optimal."
Tort rules that satisfy the Pareto criterion are considered
degirable for a number of reasons. First, such legal rules are
considered "fair" or "just" because they produce the nonconsensual exchanges that individuals would consent to were they to
bargain over what risks should be imposed.5 Second, Pareto
efficient tort rules are favored by those who believe that legal
rules should be efficient and who contend that it is not possible
to aggregate the utility of different people. 6 The Pareto criterion
differs, therefore, from the efficiency criterion that the "law and
economics" literature customarily employs, total social utility

4. Alternatively, a tort rule is Pareto efficient if no other rule (or allocation of
entitlements) exists that is unanimously preferred (weakly) by all those affected by the
rule. See Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1989); Kornhauser, An Introduction to the
Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 688-89 (1986); Note, An
Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1121
(1985) (authored by Jennifer Arlen) [hereinafter Arlen Note].
5. See Friedman, What is 'FairCompensation'forDeath or Injury?, 2 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 81, 81 (1982); Graham & Peirce, Contingent Damages for Products Liability, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 441, 444-45 (1984).
For a discussion of the Pareto criterion as a basis for legal rules, see, for example,
Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 102-05 (M. Kuperberg & C. Beitz eds. 1983); Cooter, supra note 4. For a
critique of the claim justifying Pareto efficient rules on the grounds that people would
consent to them, see Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 509, 547 (1980) (arguing that "[in the absence of a prior non-efficiency-based
theory of rights and moral deserts, it would be irrational to consent to Pareto [efficiency]
as a moral maxim"); Dworkin, Why Effiiency?, 8 HOFSTEA L. REV. 563, 574-75, 578-79
(1980) (criticizing the use of hypothetical consent as a justification for Posner's wealth
maximization criterion).
6. See e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 820-21; Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 688-90. See
generally L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE

(1973); A.

SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT

ch. 9 (1982).
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maximization, which depends on the ability to aggregate utility.7
Any discussion of optimal tort rules necessarily assumes a
starting point, a benchmark by comparison with which the rule
being tested either will or will not make some people better off
and no one worse off." Most commentators who have considered
the issue of optimal tort rules under the Pareto criterion implicitly assume that individuals in society have an a priori entitlement to be free from risk of physical harm resulting from the
activities of others.9 This particular starting point is by no means
arbitrary. It is consistent with the respect for individual autonomy that underlies our system of government; it coincides with
broadly shared notions about the nature of the protection that
the institutions of organized society afford to individuals. This
plausible assumption about an initial, pre-tort-law entitlement to
be free from bodily injury inflicted by others, however, carries
immense consequences for those interested in tort rules that
satisfy the Pareto criterion. To date, this assumption has led to
the conclusion that none of the current tort rules for physical
injury satisfy the Pareto criterion. Specifically, having adopted
the standard assumption about the initial entitlement, scholars
employing the orthodox economic model of accidents have found
that none of the standard tort rules are both Pareto superior to
a system of purely voluntary transactions and Pareto efficient in
cases of physical injury resulting from accidents between "strangers," even in the economists' perfect world of rational and
perfectly informed individuals, infallible courts, and no litigation
0
or settlement costs.'

7. See infra note 40. For an insightful critique of the objectivist theory underlying the
social welfare maximization criterion, see J. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN
ECONOMIC THEORY (1969).
8. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 49 (1988).
9. See, e.g., Fraser, Note: What is 'FairCompensation'for Death or Injury?, 4 INT'L

REV. L. & ECON. 83 (1984); Friedman, supra note 5; Arlen Note, supra note 4; see also
Haddock, McChesney, & Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45-48 (1990) (implicitly assuming that the potential
victim is entitled to be free from the risk of death or injury in question); Komesar,
Toward a General Theory of PersonalInjury Loss, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1974) (same); W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 185-89 (1987) (same); cf.
Graham & Peirce, supra note 5 (considering the issue of Pareto efficient rules for
individuals in a market relationship under various assumptions as to the initial entitlement
of potential victims). But see S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 232 n.4,
24749 (1987) (analyzing Pareto efficient tort rules for physical injury under the implicit
assumption that potential victims do not initially possess the entitlement to be free from
the risk of injury).
10. The term "strangers" refers to individuals who are not in a consensual or a market
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The orthodox model of accident law is a model of unilateral
risks, in which each individual either is a potential injurer, who
imposes risk on others but bears no risk himself, or a potential
victim, on whom others impose risk.11 In this model, tort rules
function as a substitute for a market for health by enabling
potential injurers to impose risk on potential victims without the
victims' consent, so long as the potential injurers compensate
injured victims as tort liability and damage rules require. 12 Because potential victims in this model neither impose nor wish to
impose risk on others, the opportunity that tort rules grant to
individuals to impose risk on others is of no benefit to potential
victims; the only benefit potential victims obtain from the introduction of tort rules is the promise of damage awards if injured.
Thus, given the standard assumption that each potential victim
is entitled to be free from the risk in question, in the orthodox
model a tort rule is Pareto superior to a system of purely
voluntary exchanges only if the rule ensures that any individual
injured by another is "fully compensated"13 by an award of
damages sufficient to return him to his pre-accident level of
utility, thereby ensuring that potential victims are no worse off
14
under the rule than they were previously.
It is this requirement of full compensation that yields the
conclusion that none of the standard tort rules satisfy the Pareto

relationship with each other. Accidents between strangers are the only accidents that
this Article considers. For an analysis of Pareto efficient tort rules governing physical
injuries to victims who are in a market relationship with the injurer, see, for example,
Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517, 520-21 (1984) (discussing this issue in the products liability context);
Graham & Peirce, supra note 5; Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 361-68 (1988) (same); Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and ProducerLiability, 64 REv. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977) (same).
11. Most of the law and economics literature employs this unilateral risk model. E.g.,
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Landes &
Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981); Shavell,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
12. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 245-49; Friedman, supra note 5, at 81; Arlen
Note, supra note 4, at 1121-27. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972), discusses
at length the claim that tort rules function as an involuntary market in those cases in
which transaction costs preclude an actual market.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 60-61; see, e.g., Friedman, supra note 5, at
81; Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1121-27.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 231-35, 24751; see also Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1121-28 (discussing the impossibility of devising
Pareto efficient damage awards for wrongful death resulting from accidents between
strangers).
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criterion. First, neither the liability rule of "pure negligence" nor
"negligence with contributory negligence" satisfies the full compensation requirement of Pareto superiority because each rule
permits an individual who takes "due care" to impose risks with
impunity. 15 Nor do strict liability rules necessarily satisfy the
requirement, because for certain severe injuries, full compensation is impossible because the full compensation damage award
is infinite. 6 Moreover, even when one can satisfy the full compensation requirement, a liability rule of strict liability with full
compensation damages is Pareto superior to a system of purely
voluntary transactions but is not Pareto efficient. A tort rule is
Pareto efficient if it induces individuals to take the efficient level
of care and to engage efficiently in risk spreading. Unfortunately
for those seeking Pareto efficient tort rules for accidents under
the orthodox model, strict liability, the only Pareto superior tort
rule, is not efficient because it fails to induce both efficient caretaking and efficient risk spreading in cases involving serious
physical injury.17
To circumvent the obstacles to optimal tort rules arising from
the full compensation requirement, scholars have imagined various mechanisms that would enable the potential victim, while
healthy, to obtain some compensation for the threat of future
injury, thereby lowering the amount of damages needed to fully
compensate the victim-for example, "complete insurance markets" in which a potential victim sells to others insurance against
the risk of future injury to the victim himself. These solutions,
however, implicitly accept the conclusion that the current tort
system is not efficient and, moreover, are so impractical as to
offer little hope that the tort system can be made efficient.'8
This Article argues that the problem of tort rules that satisfy
the Pareto criterion can be solved without resort to chimerical
wealth spreading devices and without abandoning the standard
assumption about an initial entitlement to freedom from risk.
The conclusion that in the current world of the tort system none

15. See infra text accompanying notes 59-63.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 70-75.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80. Risk spreading refers to an individual's
allocation of his wealth so as to maximize his expected utility given various contingent
circumstances. See infra note 55. Purchasing insurance against the possibility of an
accident and diversifying one's stock market portfolio are both examples of risk spreading.
For a more general discussion of risk spreading and insurance, see R. COOTER & T. ULEN,
supra note 8, at 55-70; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 8.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
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of the current tort rules governing physical injury satisfy the
Pareto criterion does not apply to accidents generally but rather
applies only to the narrow class of cases described by the orthodox economic model of accidents. The orthodox economic model
of accident law, as previously mentioned, views all accidents as
the product of unilateral risks in which individuals are either
potential injurers or potential victims. 19 This model, however,
ignores a salient feature of the tort system: most everyday torts
between strangers, such as automobile accidents, result from
activities that pose a risk of injury to both parties to an accident.
Most tort accidents between strangers, in other words, result
from activities in which participants both impose and bear a risk
20
of injury, activities we refer to as "bilateral risk" activities.
Each individual thus is simultaneously a potential injurer and a
potential victim-a potential seller of his own health and a
21
potential purchaser of the health of others.
Once the analysis is revised to take account of bilateral risks,
the standard assumption about an initial entitlement to freedom
from risk no longer precludes efficient tort rules; on the contrary,
it holds the solution to the problem. In a bilateral risk model, each
individual wishes to engage in an activity that imposes risk on
others. If individuals are presumptively entitled to be free from
risk of physical injury imposed by others, then, absent tort law,
no one has the right to engage in activities that pose a risk of
serious harm to others without first obtaining the consent of all
those on whom the risk is imposed. Even a modest assumption
about the incidence of transaction costs2 suffices to show that
such negotiations will not take place. In the absence of tort law,

19. See supra text accompanying note 11.
20. For example, bilateral risk accidents include automobile accidents, which alone
account for about 40% of all tort cases. P. HUBER, supra note 2, at 9.
21. See Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1135-36. The concept of bilateral risks as employed
in this Article is related to, but differs fundamentally from, the concept of reciprocal
risks developed in George Fletcher's seminal article, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540-42, 543-56 (1972). Fletcher defines a reciprocal risk accident as
one in which the risks imposed by the defendant on the plaintiff are neither greater in
degree nor different in order from those imposed by the plaintiff on the defendant. Id.
at 540-41. In contrast, bilateral risk accidents are those in which each party imposes a
risk of harm on the other; the magnitude and the nature of the risk imposed by each
individual on the other may differ.
22. The term "transaction costs" refers to all pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs associated with conducting a transaction. Transaction costs include information costs, the
costs of actually doing the transaction (for example, legal costs), and collective bargaining
problems. These costs are discussed in considerable detail in Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 12, at 1094-95.
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therefore, individuals would not be able to engage in risky activities.?
Recognition of these consequences -always latent in the standard assumption about the initial entitlement- produces the possibility of Pareto superior tort rules. The same tort rules that
enable others to impose risk on us also enable us to impose risk
on others. Because each participant in a risky activity, such as
driving a car, is a potential injurer as well as a potential victim,
the principal benefit that the introduction of the tort system
affords is not the promise of money damages for injuries suffered,
but the ability to make a choice -presumptively rational and
perfectly informed-to engage in an activity that otherwise would
be prohibited. This benefit by itself may be sufficient to fully
compensate the participant for the risk that others impose on
him; at the very least, it suggests that full compensation damages
may not be necessary in order for a tort rule to be Pareto
superior.2 4 The fact that full compensation is not required for a
tort rule to satisfy the Pareto criterion presents the possibility
of optimal tort rules.
In short, by recognizing the reciprocal nature of the risks that
many activities impose, it may become possible to devise tort
rules for physical injury that satisfy the Pareto criterion. This
suggests the need to reexamine the issue of optimal tort rules
for physical injury and to consider optimal tort rules for bilateral
25
risk activities.

23. See infra text accompanying notes 37-49.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 97-106. This conclusion is consistent with Fletcher's conclusion that no tort liability should exist for reciprocal risk accidents, but, as will
be seen, this Article's justification for this conclusion differs from that of Fletcher. First,
Fletcher's notion of reciprocal risks differs from the concept of bilateral risks examined
here. See supra note 21. In addition, Fletcher's argument in favor of not having liability
for reciprocal risks is based on a notion of fairness as opposed to a concern for economic
efficiency. Fletcher, supra note 21, at 537. Moreover, to the extent that he has an
underlying efficiency rationale for his conclusion, it is based on the claim that negligence
liability minimizes administrative costs. Id. at 547-48. In contrast, this Article considers
which rules are efficient, as opposed to which rules are fair. Moreover, this Article shows
that, even absent administrative costs, the bilateral risk accidents this Article considers
can justify negligence-inclusive liability rules as being both Pareto superior and Pareto
efficient.
25. The law and economics literature has virtually ignored bilateral risk activities,
despite their importance. The current law and economics literature on physical injuries
to strangers considers only accidents resulting from unilateral risk activities. E.g., S.
SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 10; Fraser, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 5; Arlen Note,
supra note 4. Even the literature on accidents involving purely pecuniary losses generally
considers only unilateral risk activities. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 9; Brown,
supra note 11; Landes & Posner, supra note 11; Shavell, supra note 11. The few economic
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This Article examines optimal tort rules for physical injuries
resulting from "single activity accidents" as a first step in a
26
projected wider analysis of physical injuries from bilateral risks.
Single activity accidents are those accidents that occur between
two individuals engaged in the same activity.2 7 There are two
reasons for this initial focus on single activity accidents. First,
as will become apparent, the study of single activity accidents
provides a useful starting point for a comparison of unilateral
risk and bilateral risk models because it is the bilateral risk
model most clearly distinguishable from the orthodox unilateral
risk model. Second, single activity accidents warrant particular
attention because they include automobile accidents, the primary
source of tort claims for serious permanent injury and death in
this country. 28 Such accidents deserve considerably more schol29
arly attention than they have received to date.

analyses of efficient tort rules for bilateral risk activities consider only purely pecuniary
losses. E.g., Arlen, Re-Examining Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer
Losses, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 233 (1990); Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); Leong, Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer
Losses, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 105 (1989) (showing that none of the tort liability rules
are efficient when both injurers and victims suffer losses but victims are immune from
suit); Ordover, Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 243 (1978) [hereinafter Costly Litigation]; Ordover, On the Consequences of Costly
Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents: Some New Results, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
269 (1981) [hereinafter Costly Litigation:New Results]. Moreover, these analyses consider
only the issue of efficient care-taking; they do not consider efficient risk spreading. This
Article is the first to analyze the issue of efficient risk spreading for losses resulting
from bilateral risks.
26. Many types of bilateral risk activities exist: for example, single activity accidents,
two-activity accidents resulting from simultaneous bilateral risks, and two-activity accidents resulting from subsequent bilateral risks. "Two-activity simultaneous bilateral risk"
activities are those in which the two potential parties to an accident, while engaging in
different activities, are so situated that both parties will be injured should an accident
occur. For a discussion of simultaneous bilateral risk activities in the case of purely
pecuniary losses, see Arlen, supra note 25.
The term "two-activity subsequent bilateral risks" refers to activities that at any given
moment risk injury to only one of the two parties but in which individuals alternate over
time between being potential injurers and potential victims. For example, although
motorists generally impose risks on pedestrians and not vice versa, the relationship
between driver and pedestrian constitutes a subsequent bilateral risk activity because
today's automobile drivers are tomorrow's pedestrians and vice versa. Thus, although at
any given moment an individual is either a potential injurer or a potential victim, over
time he is both a potential injurer and a potential victim with respect to the risks of
accident that these activities create.
27. Diamond, supra note 25, at 107.
28. P. HUBER, supra note 2, at 9 (automobile accidents account for 40% of all tort
cases).
29. Although automobile accidents are the basis of a substantial portion of all tort
cases, the issue of efficient tort liability and damage rules for single activity accidents
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The discussion in this Article proceeds as follows. Section I
reviews the problem of rules for unilateral risk accidents under
the Pareto criterion. Section II discusses optimal tort rules in
the context of bilateral risks generally. Section III examines the
issue of optimal tort rules for physical injuries resulting from
single activity accidents and describes the essential conclusions
of the mathematical analysis in Appendix 1.30
The analysis of single activity accidents employs Peter Diamond's seminal model of single activity accidents, 31 extended to
incorporate risk-averse individuals3 2 who face the possibility of

has received remarkably little attention. In fact, Diamond, supra note 25; Ordover, Costly
Litigation, supra note 25; and Ordover, Costly Litigation: New Results, supra note 25,
appear to be the only articles that employ an economic model to analyze efficient tort
rules for single activity accidents, and these studies consider only purely pecuniary losses.
It might appear that the prevalence of no-fault insurance laws in large part explains
the relative lack of interest in efficient tort liability and damage rules for automobile
and other single activity accidents. Some no-fault insurance laws do act to remove many
traffic accident cases from the tort system. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 84, at 606-08 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The efficiency of the no-fault system thus has
been the focus of those interested in efficient rules governing automobile accidents. See,
e.g., Epstein, Automobile No-FaultPlans: A Second Look at FirstPrinciples,13 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 769 (1980); E. Landes, Compensationfor Automobile Accident Injuries: Is the Tort
System Fair?,11 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1982); Rea, Economic Analysis of Fault and NoFault Liability Systems, 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 444 (1987). No-fault laws cannot explain the
absence of interest in efficient tort law for automobile accidents that result in serious
permanent physical injuries, however, because they do not apply to these injuries. The
various no-fault laws preclude accident victims from suing in tort only if pecuniary losses
and pain and suffering damages are below a specific amount. In all states, this threshold
amount is less than that involved in serious permanent physical injuries. See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra, S 84, at 606-08. Moreover, many no-fault statutes explicitly
allow a victim to sue in tort if the injury in question results in death or serious permanent
physical injury. Id.
30. Appendix II extends the model analyzed in Appendix I to consider the case in
which individuals do not necessarily suffer the same injury should an accident occur.
Appendix II also confirms the result, presented in Section III and Appendix I, that pure
negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, and strict liability with contributory
negligence are identically Pareto efficient in that the same damage awards induce
efficiency under each of these liability rules. As in Appendix I, the model shows that full
compensation damages are not necessary for efficiency. Appendix II is contained in J.
ARLEN, RECONSIDERING EFFICIENT TORT RULES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE CASE OF SINGLE

ACTIVITY ACCIDENTS (Emory University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 5, 1990).
31. Diamond, supra note 25.
32. An individual is risk-averse if he would prefer to receive with certainty a given
sum of money, such as $X, than to make a bet with an expected value of $X. In other
words, a risk-averse individual is someone who would pay to avoid a risk. See generally
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 8. The assumption that individuals are risk-averse is
consistent with the observation that individuals are willing to pay a premium for insurance
that exceeds the expected cost of the loss, where the expected cost of the loss is the
probability of the loss multiplied by the value of the loss. Id. This assumption thus is

50
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suffering a serious permanent physical injury. Section III and
Appendix I apply this model to determine whether any of the
four standard liability rules-pure negligence, negligence with
contributory negligence, pure strict liability, or strict liability
with contributory negligence 33 - are optimal for the single activity
accidents described by. the model.
As discussed above, a full analysis of a tort rule under the
Pareto criterion, whatever the model employed, involves two
issues. The first is whether tort rules are a justified interference
with the market system in that they are Pareto superior to a
system of purely voluntary transactions. Section III shows that
in the case of single activity accidents, unlike the case of unilateral risks, the introduction of tort rules does not make individuals
worse off, even when damages do not fully compensate victims
for their losses; thus, each of the standard tort rules that this
Section considers are Pareto superior to a system that permits
only voluntary transactions. The second issue is whether any of
the Pareto superior tort rules are Pareto efficient.3 4 As will be
explained, a tort rule is Pareto efficient in the model considered
here if it maximizes the utility of each individual subject to the
rule by inducing each individual to engage in efficient care-taking
and efficient risk spreading.3 5 The greater part of Section III and
of the mathematical analysis set forth in Appendix I analyzes
efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading. This Section
and Appendix show that, in contrast with the unilateral risk

more realistic than the assumption of many economic models that individuals are indifferent to risk; that is, that individuals are risk-neutral. E.g., Brown, supra note 11;
Diamond, supra note 25; Landes & Posner, supra note 11; Ordover, Costly Litigation,
supra note 25; Shavell, supra note 11. This Article is the first analysis of accidents
resulting from bilateral risks to incorporate the assumption that individuals are riskaverse.
33. This Article examines these four liability rules because they are the rules generally
examined by economic analysis of law scholars, and they are the only liability rules
examined by those who have considered efficient tort rules for physical injuries. E.g., S.
SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 10; Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75
VA. L. REV. 383 (1989); Danzon, supra note 10; Fraser, supra note 9. Consistent with this
prior literature on efficient tort rules for physical injury, this Article does not examine
comparative and relative negligence. For a discussion of comparative negligence in the
context of purely pecuniary losses, see Cooter & Ulen, An Economic Casefor Comparative
Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986); Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of
Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985); Rea, The Economics of Comparative
Negligence, 7 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 149 (1987).
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. Efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading are the standard conditions for
Pareto efficiency when individuals are risk-averse. This Article does not consider a
further issue, the "efficient level of activity." See infra note 109.
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model, three tort rules-pure negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, and strict liability with contributory negligence-are Pareto efficient in the single activity accident context
in that they induce both efficient care-taking and efficient risk
spreading. By contrast, this portion of the Article shows that the
rule of pure strict liability is inefficient. Finally, Section III and
Appendix I show that full compensation damages are not necessary
for Pareto efficiency under any of the three efficient tort rules.
These results suggest that those interested in tort rules for
physical injury that satisfy the Pareto criterion should redirect
their efforts. Instead of attempting to circumvent the familiar
obstacles to optimality in the unilateral risk model, scholarly
attention might be engaged more profitably in further exploration
of the bilateral risk model, which offers a more accurate description of most tortious accidents and presents the possibility of
optimal tort rules. The results of this analysis of Pareto efficiency
also should be of interest to those who favor social utility maximization notions of efficiency, because in the model considered
here any tort rule that is Pareto efficient also maximizes total
36
social utility.
I.

A.

PARETO EFFICIENCY AND UNILATERAL RISKS

Tort Rules and Transaction Costs

To understand both the nature of optimal tort rules under the
Pareto criterion and the challenge to orthodox law and economics
that this Article presents, one must first understand the orthodox
economic view of when and why tort rules are necessary to
promote efficiency.37 A central tenet of economics generally, and
of law and economics in particular, is that society's preferences
should reflect the preferences of its members.3 8 This belief in the
primacy of individual preferences provides the foundation for the
partiality of economics for voluntary transactions, such as market
transactions. Absent coercion or other imperfections, voluntary
transactions are unambiguously welfare improving in that a voluntary transaction clearly makes both parties better off. Through
the voluntary transaction, each party reveals his preference for

36. As it happens, the tort rules that are Pareto efficient under the present analysis
also are efficient under the social utility maximization criterion for efficiency. See infra
note 136.
37. This is not to say that efficiency is the only goal of the tort system. Efficiency is,
however, the only goal that this Article considers.
38. E.g., Graham & Peirce, supra note 5, at 445.
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the product of the exchange over his situation prior to the
exchange. These exchanges thus generally can be relied on to
improve the welfare of individuals in society, even in cases in
which the government cannot determine the utility functions of
the individuals engaged in such transactions.
Because individual preferences are subjective and are truly
known only by an individual himself, economics generally encourages reliance on voluntary transactions to reallocate resources in a way that promotes individual (and thus social) welfare
and generally does not encourage government intervention to
reallocate resources.3 9 Government intervention to reallocate resources is warranted only when voluntary exchanges will not
take place as desired, and even then only when government
intervention will improve the situation. The Pareto criterion
provides a standard for determining when government intervention to reallocate resources "improves" a situation: if it makes
40
at least one person better off and makes no one worse off.
Government intervention to reallocate resources is Pareto efficient when it cannot be improved upon, in the sense that any
change in the government's approach that would improve the
41
well-being of one person would be detrimental to someone else.
Tort rules are one form of government intervention that reallocates resources. From an economic standpoint, the essence of
all tort rules is that they allow an individual to avoid the
bargaining process associated with voluntary exchanges and to
appropriate another's "entitlement,' 42 such as physical well-being,
without first obtaining that person's consent, so long as the taker
pays for the entitlement according to the price schedule set by
the tort system. Tort rules thus substitute an involuntary exchange for a voluntary one. 43 As these exchanges are involuntary,

39. For an excellent discussion of the subjectivist, as opposed to the objectivist,
approach to economics, see Buchanan, supra note 7.
40. If each individual's utility is entirely subjective (and cannot be measured by others),
the requirement that no one be made worse off is necessary to ensure that a change is
welfare improving. If others cannot measure individual utility, then a determination of
aggregate social utility is impossible, and the only way to be sure that society as a whole
is better off is to know that at least one person is better off and no one is worse off.
See Cooter, supra note 4,at 820-21. See generally A. SEN, supra note 6,ch. 9.
41. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
42. This Article uses the term "entitlements" broadly to refer to those commodities,
monetary wealth, and nonpecuniary assets such as health that an individual possesses,
such that they are properly included within the individual's utility function.
43. This view of the tort system, in particular of liability rules, is based on the analysis
presented in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1106-11.
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economic analysis favors the use of tort rules only when some
form of market failure precludes reliance on voluntary transactions and only if the tort rules will improve matters in the sense
44
previously described.
The question thus arises: What circumstances warrant government intervention in the form of tort rules? In 1960, Ronald
Coase established that under certain assumptions, including the
absence of transaction costs, 45 government intervention in the
form of tort rules is unnecessary to achieve efficiency, even in
those situations in which individuals impose a risk of injury on
others. 46 Rather, in a perfect world, individuals achieve efficiency
by bargaining among themselves for an exchange of entitlements,
including the entitlement to impose or to avoid the risk of
physical injury. 4? As Coase recognized, the real world differs in
significant respects from the perfect world that this economic
model envisions. High transaction costs preclude many Paretoimproving exchanges that otherwise would occur in a perfect
world of no transaction costs. 48 Although individuals wishing to
impose a risk of harm on others could in theory bargain with
those others and compensate them for the risk, thereby leading
to an optimal allocation of entitlements, transaction costs in the
real world normally preclude such exchanges. For example, the
transaction costs associated with the large number of people who
drive automobiles preclude the formation of markets in the risks
imposed and borne as a result of automobile use. Thus, when
transaction costs are high, voluntary exchanges cannot be relied
on to produce the efficient outcome.
Transaction costs provide the central justification for tort rules
in the standard economic analysis of the tort system: tort rules
circumvent the transaction cost problem by permitting the involuntary exchange of entitlements.49 As explained above, however, not all efforts to use tort rules to circumvent the transaction
cost problem are desirable. Economic analysis dictates that tort
rules should be employed to permit such involuntary exchanges
only when allowing such exchanges improves the welfare of
individuals in society.

44. See supra text accompanying notes 4041; Graham & Peirce, supra note 5, at 44445; Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1121-22.
45. See supra note 22.
46. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
47. Id.; see Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A
Comment, 11 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1968).
48. Coase, supra note 46; see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12.
49. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1106-10.
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Accepting the Pareto criterion as the standard of improvement,
this view of the tort system as an alternative to a system of
voluntary transactions in a world of high transaction costs produces two requirements that a tort rule must satisfy when
individuals otherwise possess an enforceable entitlement to be
free from the risk in question.50 First, the tort rule must be
Pareto superior to a system of purely voluntary transactions with
high transaction costs in that the rule must ensure that those
put at risk are no worse off than they would be in a system in
which no one may impose risk on another without the other's
consent and transaction costs preclude such bargains. 51 In other
words, potential victims must be no worse off ex ante than they
would be in the absence of the risk. In addition, the tort rule
selected should itself not be subject to improvement: it should
be Pareto efficient. As explained previously, a tort rule is Pareto
efficient if it maximizes the utility of the individuals affected by
the rule in that any change in the tort rule, and thus in the
allocation of entitlements, that would make someone better off
would make someone else worse off.52 The standard conditions
for utility maximization produce two conditions for efficient tort
rules: tort rules must induce individuals to take the efficient
level of care and to spread the risk of loss efficiently. Specifically,
tort rules must induce expenditures on accident preventionthat is, "care"-by risk imposers such that the social marginal
cost of care equals the social marginal benefit of care; 53 and tort
rules, or tort rules combined with an insurance system, must
enable risk-averse potential victims5 4 to55spread efficiently the
risks associated with having an accident.

50. This Article, like most prior analyses, considers those risks from which the victim
would be entitled to be free absent the tort system and assumes that the victim would
be able to enforce his legal right to be free from such risks absent the tort system. See
supra text accompanying note 9. Legally imposed remedies, such as injunctions or
damages, might be used to enforce this right. Alternatively, the right might be enforced
through nonlegal enforcement mechanisms such as blood feuds. The assumption that an
individual can protect his initial entitlement is implicit in most prior Pareto efficiency
analyses. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 5.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
52. See supra text accompanying note 4.
53. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 215-27.
54. See supra note 32.
55. A risk-averse person is someone who prefers certainty to uncertainty. See supra
note 32. Faced with a loss of $m should some event occur, a risk-averse individual would
prefer to spread the risk of loss by paying an amount of money whether or not the loss
occurs in return for a promise of reimbursement should the loss occur (such as occurs
with insurance). This transfer of wealth between the situation in which the individual
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B. Efficient Tort Rules: The Orthodox Model
To date, the economic analysis of tort law has concluded that
none of the four standard tort rules-pure negligence, negligence
with contributory negligence, pure strict liability, and strict liability with contributory negligence5 6 - governing accidents resulting in serious permanent physical injury satisfy the Pareto
criterion. 57 All previous efficiency analyses of physical injury,
however, have employed the orthodox economic model of the tort
system, which is a model of unilateral risks. This model assumes
that all individuals are divided into two types: potential injurers,
who impose risk on others but have no risk imposed on them,
and potential victims, who have risk imposed on them but who
do not impose risk on others.5
1. Negligence Liability Rules in the Orthodox Model
Given this orthodox unilateral risk model of accidents, neither
pure negligence nor negligence with contributory negligence is
Pareto superior to a system of purely voluntary transactions
when victims initially possess an entitlement to be free from the
risk in question. Although both rules induce efficient care-taking
and efficient risk spreading, 59 these rules are not Pareto superior
to a system of purely voluntary transactions because neither rule
ensures that the introduction of tort rules leaves no one worse
off than he would be otherwise. When, absent the tort system,
the victim possesses an enforceable entitlement to be free from
the risk in question, the requirement that tort rules not make
anyone worse off translates, in the orthodox model, into a requirement that each potential victim be fully compensated for
the costs of any risk imposed on him. In the orthodox model, the

suffers the loss and the situation in which he does not suffer the loss is referred to as
risk spreading. Risk spreading is efficient when the individual allocates his wealth to
maximize his expected utility given these various contingent circumstances. See generally
R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 8, at 55-70; S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 8. Risk

spreading can be achieved in either of two ways. The tort system can impose an
involuntary insurance scheme, or the tort system can allow individuals to spread risks
efficiently through the purchase of insurance on private insurance markets. See generally
S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 9. The concept of efficient risk spreading is discussed in
greater detail at infra text accompanying notes 76-80 and in S. SHAVELL, supra note 9,
chs. 8-9.
56. See supra note 33.
57. See supra note 50 and text accompanying note 9.
58. See Brown, supra note 11, at 326; Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 867; Shavell,
supra note 11, at 1.
59. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 215-27.
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tort system only compensates potential victims through damage
awards. Because damages are awarded ex post, to injured victims,
and not ex ante, to those at risk of being injured, 60 to satisfy the
full compensation requirement tort rules must entitle potential
victims to damages whenever they are injured as a result of risk
imposed by others and award each victim sufficient damages to
leave him as well off injured as he was when healthy. In the
language of economics, the damages awarded must be sufficient
6 1
to return the victim to his pre-accident level of utility.
Negligence liability rules do not satisfy this full compensation
requirement. Negligence rules permit a potential tortfeasor to
impose risk on a victim without liability so long as the potential
tortfeasor takes due care. Under both pure negligence and negligence with contributory negligence, when due care equals the
efficient level of care and individuals and courts have perfect
information, potential injurers always take due care and thus are
never liable for the injuries they cause. 62 Victims accordingly
receive no compensation for their injuries. As compared to a
world without tort rules in which each individual can enforce an
entitlement to be free from risk, potential victims are worse off.
Negligence rules in this context therefore do not satisfy the
Pareto criterion.6 3
2. Strict Liability for Physical Injuries: The Orthodox Model
In the orthodox model, strict liability rules for physical injury
often are not Pareto superior and are never Pareto efficient.
Strict liability rules require an injurer to pay damages to all
whom he injures. Because injurers compensate victims for all
losses, strict liability rules would appear to satisfy the Pareto
criterion as long as damage awards fully compensate each victim
for his loss. This conclusion is correct when the injuries result
in purely pecuniary losses;64 it is incorrect, however, when the

60. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, S 30, at 165. But see id. (Supp.
1988), S 54, at 60 n.34 (discussing recent cases allowing recovery for "cancerphobia").
61. See Friedman, supra note 5; Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1121-22.
62. E.g., Brown, supra note 11; Landes & Posner, supra note 11; Shavell, supra note
11; see Diamond, supra note 25 (obtaining the same result for single activity accidents).
63. But see S. SHAVELL, upra note 9, at 232 n.4, 247-49. Shavell shows that Pareto
efficiency is possible under a negligence rule, but his analysis depends on the implicit
assumption that victims are not initially entitled to be free from the risk in question. Id.
For a more detailed discussion, see infra note 94.
64. Throughout this Article, the term "pecuniary losses" refers to injuries to commod-
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injuries result in nonpecuniary losses, 65 such as those occasioned
by serious, permanent physical injuries.
In the case of injuries that result in purely pecuniary losses,
strict liability rules satisfy the Pareto criterion when damage
awards equal the victim's pecuniary loss. A rule of strict liability
with full compensation damage awards clearly satisfies the requirement that victims be left no worse off under a tort rule
than they would be in its absence. In addition, in cases of purely
pecuniary losses, strict liability with full compensation damages
is Pareto efficient. Strict liability with full compensation damages
leads to efficient care-taking because it forces each injurer to
pay all the costs that he imposes on others. Strict liability thereby
induces him, through appeal to his own self-interest, to expend
resources on accident avoidance up to the point at which the
marginal cost of care equals the marginal benefit of care to
society, namely the resulting reduction in expected accident costs. 6
In addition, in the purely pecuniary loss context, strict liability
with full compensation damages induces efficient risk spreading
by victims.6 7 Given a risk of injury, a risk-averse individual
maximizes his utility when his wealth should he remain uninjured
and his wealth should he be injured are such that he derives the
same utility from the last dollar of wealth in each of the two
states. In other words, risk spreading is efficient when the
potential victim's marginal utility of wealth is equal whether he
is injured or uninjured.68 An accident that results in purely
pecuniary losses, by definition, affects only the victim's wealth.
The victim thus feels equivalently about his last dollar of wealth,
whether uninjured or injured, when his wealth is the same in
either condition. Strict liability with full compensation damages
for pecuniary losses ensures that the victim's wealth is the same

ities that Philip Cook and Daniel Graham refer to as "replaceable commodities." Cook &
Graham, The Demandfor Insuranceand Protection:The Case of IrreplaceableCommodities,
91 Q. J. ECON. 143, 144-46 (1977). The term "nonpecuniary losses" refers to injuries to
commodities Cook and Graham call "irreplaceable commodities." Id. As defined by Cook
and Graham, the concepts of replaceable and irreplaceable are purely subjective. A
commodity is replaceable if the owner of the commodity perceives that equivalent
commodities are available on the market; market prices therefore determine the value
to the owner of a replaceable commodity, and that value does not depend on the owner's
wealth. Id. at 145. An irreplaceable commodity is one for which no equivalent commodities
are available on the market. The value of an irreplaceable commodity to its owner may
vary with the owner's wealth. Id. at 146.
65. Id.
66. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 215-26; see Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1116.
67. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
68. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 203.
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regardless of whether he is injured; it therefore results in effi69
cient risk spreading by the victim.
Although in the case of purely pecuniary losses strict liability
with full compensation damages is both Pareto superior and
Pareto efficient, in the case of accidents resulting in serious
physical injury, strict liability is not necessarily Pareto superior
and is never Pareto efficient. A rule of strict liability with full
compensation damages is not invariably Pareto superior to a
system of purely voluntary transactions because full compensation for losses is not possible for victims of certain physical
injuries.7 0 But if victims are not fully compensated, then strict
liability makes them worse off than they would be otherwise.
The problem for full compensation arises, first, because in the
orthodox model the only compensation available to victims is
monetary compensation and, second, because the current tort
system awards damages ex post for physical injuries suffered and
not ex ante for the mere risk of injury.7 1 Thus, to achieve full
compensation, money damages paid to the injured victim must
72
be sufficient to return him to his pre-accident level of utility.
Victims of certain severe injuries, however, derive little or no
benefit from money they receive above the bare amount necessary to keep them alive.73 When money has little value to the
injured victim, the amount necessary to return him to his preaccident level of utility may exceed any injurer's ability to pay,
in which case the victim will not be fully compensated. Moreover,
and more importantly, in cases in which the victim receives no
benefit whatsoever from wealth paid to him over and above the

69. See id. at 210-11. This discussion focuses on efficient risk spreading by victims and
assumes implicitly that injurers are risk-neutral. When injurers are risk-averse, risk
spreading by injurers is efficient if the injurers can purchase liability insurance. When
insurance companies are perfectly informed and can monitor care-taking by injurers,
insured injurers will take the efficient level of care. For a more thorough discussion of
liability and insurance, see id., chs. 8-9.
70. Arlen Note, supra note 4, discusses this issue in greater depth.
71. The current tort system grants a cause of action only when an individual has
suffered an actual injury; an individual cannot sue for the mere additional risk of injury
that another imposes on him. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 30, at 165. But see id.
(Supp. 1988, S 54, at 60 n.34 (discussing recent cases allowing recovery for "cancerphobia").
72. See Friedman, supra note 5; Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1119-20. But see Haddock,
McChesney, & Spiegel, supra note 9, at 13-17 (damages for wrongful death need only
remove the gains to the defendant of taking action, and need not make the victim whole,
in those cases in which the purpose of the rules is to completely dissuade the defendant
from imposing the risk in question on the victim). For a more complete discussion of the
Haddock, McChesney, & Spiegel analysis, see infra note 201.
73. If we assume that some accident victims derive no benefit from the prolongation
of life, the conclusion advanced in the text holds with even greater force.
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amount necessary to keep him alive,7 4 monetary damages can
never return the victim to his pre-accident level of utility; in this
circumstance, full compensation damages are "infinite."7 5
Further, even in those cases in which full compensation is
possible, a rule of strict liability with full compensation damages
is Pareto superior but not Pareto efficient because full compensation damages for physical injuries induce efficient care-taking
by potential injurers but preclude efficient risk spreading by
victims.76 In contrast to purely pecuniary losses, physical injuries
affect more than just the victim's wealth; they also result in
nonpecuniary losses.7 7 The amount of wealth necessary to fully
compensate the victim for both his pecuniary and nonpecuniary
losses exceeds the efficient level of insurance coverage; in other
words, full compensation damages exceed the level of wealth at
which the individual's marginal utility of wealth is equal whether
he is injured or uninjured.78 Thus, the damage award that fully
compensates the potential accident victim who suffers a physical
injury and induces efficient care-taking by injurers does not
maximize the victim's expected utility because this newly re-

74. For example, a permanently comatose individual with neither spouse nor children
probably receives no benefit from any wealth in excess of the amount necessary to keep
him alive. See supra note 73.
75. Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1124, 1127-28; see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 6.12, at 182 (3d ed. 1986); Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical
Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687, 693 (1971).
76. E.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 231-33, 247-51; see Cook & Graham, supra note
64, at 159.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 111-19.
78. E.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 247-51; see Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at
159 (showing that full insurance coverage for nonpecuniary losses exceeds efficient
insurance coverage).
The conclusion that full compensation damages preclude efficient risk spreading is
consistent with the conclusion that full insurance coverage of physical injuries is not
efficient and that the efficient level of coverage is less than full coverage. See id. The
conclusion that full coverage for physical injuries is inefficient is intuitive because it
comports with casual observations about individuals' insurance decisions. Few people
would consider themselves as well off when permanently comatose as they are when
perfectly healthy, even if they were to receive $5 million in insurance payments. Yet few
persons purchase even as much as $5 million in insurance against such losses. See Rubin,
The Pitfalls of Hedonic Value Use, 11 Nat'l L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 16, col. 3 (observing
that individuals generally do not insure their lives for $2 million). The reason individuals
who could afford to do so do not purchase such substantial insurance coverage against
such losses is simple: purchasing a $5 million policy requires a person to spend wealth
that he otherwise could use to enjoy life while uninjured in order to receive, when
comatose, an amount of money that far exceeds the amount he will be able to enjoy in
his comatose state. See infra note 149 (discussing the availability of insurance against
nonpecuniary losses).
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ceived wealth would have afforded him more utility had he
enjoyed some part of it prior to the accident. Because the victim
would thus be better off if he could receive less wealth when
injured in return for an increase in wealth when uninjured, his
risk spreading is inefficient. 79 Because insurance markets are not
complete in that the victim cannot shift the excess wealth from
his injured state to his uninjured state, the victim is unable to
80
correct this inefficiency, and it will persist.
The conclusion that full compensation damages are infinite in
some cases and preclude efficient risk spreading in all cases has
disturbed scholars. The possibility that efficient damages for
particular injuries may be infinite is particularly troubling because it implies that the efficient rate of such injuries, and thus
of the associated risk producing activities, is zero.8 ' Although for
some risks this conclusion is correct, 82 many activities that impose
risks of severe injuries produce such substantial benefits that it
is unlikely that the efficient level of such activities is zero. For
example, although automobile driving subjects others to a risk
of death or permanent coma, modern society's dependence on the
automobile suggests that some (possibly reduced) level of automobile use is nevertheless efficient.
A belief in the importance of optimal legal rules, combined
with an intuitive sense that it is not efficient to forbid all
activities that impose a risk of injuries such as death or coma,
led some scholars to develop creative solutions to the problem
of optimal tort rules for physical injury. Those who labored at
this task focused their attention on the problem of damage rules
that only award compensation ex post. As previously observed,
one problem with ex post compensation is that certain serious
injuries eliminate the victim's ability to use additional wealth to
provide utility; a second problem is that the amount necessary
to compensate the victim fully is so large that it precludes

79. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 247-51.
80. E.g., id.; Danzon, supra note 10, at 520-22 (discussing this issue in the context of
products liability); Schwartz, supra note 10 (same); Spence, supra note 10 (same); see
Friedman, supra note 5 (analyzing efficient tort rules when insurance markets are
complete).
81. See R. POSNER, supra note 75, S 6.12, at 182; Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1128.
The statement in the text assumes that care-taking cannot completely eliminate the risks
created by risky activities; thus, the only way to eliminate such risks entirely is to not
engage in the activity.
82. For an analysis of the appropriate damage remedy for such risks, see Haddock,
McChesney, & Spiegel, supra note 9, at 13. See also infra note 201 (discussing the abovecited analysis).
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efficient risk spreading.8 Responding to these difficulties, scholars have attempted to solve the full compensation problem by
inventing mechanisms that enable potential victims to receive
some or all of the monetary compensation for a risked future
84
injury while they are healthy and can better enjoy their wealth.
These devices include "complete insurance markets," in which
potential victims can "sell insurance on themselves"; 85 markets
in "unmatured tort claims," in which uninjured victims can sell
to others their possible future damage claims;88 and ex ante
damages, which compensate individuals while healthy for the risk
imposed on them, regardless of whether they are eventually
injured.87 Scholars have shown that when any of these mechanisms are used to enable the victim to enjoy his compensation
while healthy, strict liability rules do satisfy the Pareto criterion.
Under these mechanisms, finite damages invariably suffice to
leave the victim as well off after imposition of the risk as he
was before because under each of these devices the victim can
receive and enjoy the compensation when he is healthy; moreover,
these mechanisms solve the conflict between efficient care-taking
and efficient risk spreading.8
Such efforts, although ingenious, do not solve the problem of
optimal tort rules for the current tort system or any feasible
tort system. They are thus of limited interest to those who argue
that the current tort system is efficient or who claim that the
system should be-and can be made-efficient. Existing insurance markets are not "complete," 89 and there is little prospect
that insurance markets in which individuals sell insurance on
themselves will be developed.9 0 Similarly, individuals currently

83. See supra text accompanying notes 66-80.
84. E.g., Cooter, supra note 33; Friedman, supra note 5; Shukaitis, A Market in Personal
Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987); see Graham & Peirce, supra note 5
(discussing ex ante damages for products liability).
85. Friedman, supra note 5, at 89-91.
86. E.g., Cooter, supra note 33, at 383.
87. Friedman, supra note 5, at 88-89; see Graham & Peirce, supra note 5, at 455-56
(discussing ex ante damages for products liability).
88. Cooter, supra note 33; Fraser, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 5.
89. Friedman, supra note 5, at 91 (observing that existing insurance markets are not
complete).
90. As explained previously, in a complete insurance market, an individual may agree
to pay to another, the purchaser, a certain sum in the event that the individual is
seriously injured in the future, in return for an up-front payment to the individual by
the purchaser. In a world of imperfect information, complete insurance markets raise at
least two problems. The first is a "reverse moral hazard" problem: the purchaser of the
insurance-who might be the individual's employer or some other person in an ongoing
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may not sell their possible future tort claims, and it is unlikely
that a market in tort claims can be created 1 As for ex ante
damages, damages in the current tort system are paid ex post,
after the occurrence of the injury, not ex ante, based on the risk
of future harm. 92 The development of a tort system that awards
damages ex ante to compensate for risk to all those subjected to
risk is unlikely because the obvious administrative costs of such
a system render it impracticable. 93 Moreover, these solutions
apply only to strict liability rules; they do not offer the possibility
of optimal negligence rules.
Scholars have constructed negligence liability rules for physical
injury that satisfy the Pareto criterion only by assuming, contrary
to the standard hypothesis, that potential victims are not initially
entitled to be free from the risk in question. This starting point
permits Pareto superior negligence liability rules because victims
who are not otherwise entitled to be free from risk of injury in
the first place are not made worse off when injurers impose risk
on them without compensating them for their injuries. 94 The

relationship with the individual-now has an incentive to increase the probability that
the individual will be injured. The second problem is that the purchaser of this insurance
may have difficulty ensuring that the individual retains sufficient wealth to satisfy the
terms of the insurance contract should the individual be injured.
91. The notion of a market in potential tort claims is similar to the concept of complete
insurance markets, but the idea of a tort claims market has received more scholarly
attention. A Virginia Law Review Symposium on the Law and Economics of Bargaining
considers this issue in detail. See Cooter, supra note 33; Goetz, Commentary on "Towards
a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": Collateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REv. 413 (1989);
Schwartz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": A Long Way
Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423 (1989).
92. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 30, at 165. But see id. (Supp. 1988), § 54,
at 60 n.34 (discussing recent cases allowing recovery for "cancerphobia").
93. See Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1120 n.37 (discussing the impracticability of ex
ante damage rules).
94. S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 232 n.4, 247-49. Shavell shows that efficiency is possible
under a negligence liability rule, but his analysis depends on the implicit assumption that
victims are not entitled to be free from the risk in question. Id. He concludes that
negligence rules are Pareto efficient because his model does not entitle victims to be
free from any risk of harm and, therefore, they are not made worse off if injurers impose
reasonable risks of harm on them without compensation; that is, they are not made worse
off if injurers impose the risks associated with taking due care. Thus, Shavell shows that,
setting due care equal to the efficient level of care, Pareto efficiency is possible under a
negligence rule if damages are sufficiently high to induce injurers to take due care.
Injurers will then take due care and will not be liable for damages; victims are no worse
off because they are not entitled to be free from this risk. Moreover, as victims do not
receive damages, damage awards do not interfere with the victim's ability to engage in
efficient risk spreading through the purchase of accident insurance. Shavell's results do
not apply to those cases in which each potential victim is initially entitled to be free
from the risk of injury in question. Moreover, it appears that Shavell's results do not

1990]

PERSONAL INJURY

success of such an analysis, however, depends completely on the
assumption that potential victims are not otherwise entitled to
be free from risk. Such an assumption is probably unattractive
as applied to most everyday torts, such as those resulting from
automobile accidents, because the assumption is inconsistent with
the belief in the personal integrity of each individual that lies at
the foundation of the common law tort system.
II.

PHYSICAL INJURY FROM BILATERAL RISKS

Although in the orthodox model such mechanisms as complete
insurance markets, markets in unmatured tort claims, and ex ante
damages are prerequisites for optimal tort rules for physical injury
in those cases in which the victim is initially entitled to be free
from the risk,95 such mechanisms are not necessarily prerequisites
to optimal tort rules in the actual world of the tort system. The
orthodox model of the tort system describes an extremely narrow
class of cases: those in which potential victims are never potential
injurers and vice versa. In reality, few risky activities involving
strangers 97 are best described as situations in which one person
is an injurer who imposes but does not bear the risk of injury,
and another bears risk but does not impose any. Rather, most
everyday torts between strangers result from situations in which
each person is engaged in an activity that imposes a risk of harm
on the person himself, as well as on others.98 In other words, most
everyday torts result from bilateral risk activities in which each
individual is both a potential injurer and a potential victim. 99
Accidents between motorists are an example of everyday accidents
resulting from bilateral risk activities. 0 0
The move from unilateral to bilateral risks is more than one
of those minor changes in assumptions for which economists are
famous. The switch from a unilateral to a bilateral risk model
implies a fundamental change in the economic paradigm of the

apply to those cases in which injurers are initially entitled to impose as much risk as
they choose because negligence rules force injurers to pay for imposing unreasonable
risks.
95. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying note 11.
97. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
99. As discussed in notes 21 and 24, supra, this notion of bilateral risks echoes the
concept of reciprocal risks that George Fletcher developed in his seminal article, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory. Fletcher, supra note 21.
100. See supra note 20.
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tort system and suggests a possible revision of the orthodox
claim that optimal tort rules are those that induce the exchanges
of entitlements between an injurer and his victim that would
take place in the marketplace in the absence of transaction costs.
As explained above, the unilateral risk model treats the tort
system as creating a market in certain entitlements -those that
the presence of high transaction costs otherwise would precludeby allowing involuntary exchanges of those entitlements. 1 1 Under
this view, injurers are purchasers of entitlements (here, the
physical well-being of others), accident victims are sellers, and
damage awards are the price at which participants exchange the
entitlements. In the bilateral risk context, by contrast, all individuals impose risk on others by engaging in a particular activity.
Unlike the unilateral risk model-in which, absent a tort system,
potential victims do not impose risk on others and can go about
their business-in cases of bilateral risk activity, each individual
engaged in the activity imposes risk on others and, absent the
tort system, no one would be permitted to engage in the activity
without obtaining the consent of others. When high transaction
costs preclude these voluntary exchanges, each individual stands
to benefit from the introduction of tort rules that enable him to
engage in a risk-producing activity from which he would otherwise be barred.
In the bilateral risk context, therefore, the tort system operates
not as a market in health, in which injurers appropriate the
physical well-being of victims in return for compensating them
monetarily, but as a reciprocal exchange of the right to engage
in risky activities, in which monetary damages are not the central
mechanism of compensation. 10 2 Because the primary benefit of
the introduction of the tort system comes in the form of the
capacity to impose risk on others, as opposed to the right to
collect monetary damages if injured, optimal tort rules may be
possible without full compensation damages. Because the requirement of full compensation damages is the reason optimal tort
rules are not possible in the unilateral risk context, removing
this requirement opens the possibility that optimal tort rules
may nevertheless be possible in the case of everyday torts
resulting from bilateral risks.
The question thus arises: Which, if any, of the standard tort
rules 10 3 are optimal when applied to bilateral risk activities, and

101. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.
102. See Arlen Note, supra note 4, at 1135-36.
103. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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what is the optimal level of damages? To address this question,
one must develop an economic model of accidental physical injuries resulting from bilateral risk activities. A full examination
of the question would require a separate analysis of accidents
resulting from each category of bilateral risk activities; that is,
single activity accidents, two-activity accidents resulting from
simultaneous bilateral risks,'10 4 and two-activity accidents resulting from subsequent bilateral risks. 10 5 As previously explained,
this Article begins that study with an examination of tort rules
for serious physical injuries resulting from single activity accidents, which are the primary source of tort claims for serious
permanent injury and death in this country. 0 6

III.

EFFICIENT TORT RULES FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING
FROM SINGLE ACTIVITY ACCIDENTS

An economic analysis of single activity accidents is by its
nature mathematical. Appendix I sets forth the mathematical
analysis of the full single activity accident model developed for
this Article. Readers interested in this analysis are encouraged
to turn to that Appendix for an account of the proofs underlying
the contentions that follow. For those who prefer a textual
discussion to mathematics, this Section provides a brief description of the model used and presents the central results of the
mathematical analysis of the model. Of necessity, these results
are merely stated and are not proved; all proofs are confined to

Appendix
A.

1.107

The Model

The model employed is based on Diamond's model of single
activity accidents, 0 8 extended here to risk-averse individuals who
face the possibility of suffering a serious permanent physical
injury. Following Diamond, it is assumed that the relevant world

104. See supra note 26.
105. Id.; see Arlen, supra note 25 (discussing simultaneous bilateral
cases involving purely pecuniary losses). This Article is the first to
injuries resulting from bilateral risk activities. It is also the first to
risk spreading in the bilateral risk context.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
107. Readers interested in a further extension of this mathematical
developed in Appendix H1. See supra note 30.
108. Diamond, supra note 25.

risk activities for
examine physical
consider efficient

model will find it
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is composed of a fixed' 0 9 and large number of identical, riskaverse individuals. Each person is engaged in an activity, for
example driving, that benefits him monetarily and presents a
risk of accident both to him and to others engaged in the activity.
Should an accident occur, each party to the accident suffers
the same serious, permanent physical injury. 110 This physical
injury has two distinct consequences for a victim. First, the
injury results in pecuniary losses,"' which include increased
medical expenses and lost expected future earnings. In addition,
the injury has a nonpecuniary consequence: it directly alters the
victim's utility function." 2 It is assumed that the injury itself,
apart from any impact on the victim's wealth, makes the victim
worse off; that is, it lowers the utility the individual gets out of

109. Consistent with the other articles on efficient tort rules for physical injury, this
Article considers only the issues of efficient care-taking and risk spreading. This Article
does not consider the efficient level of the activity, measured here by the number of
drivers. The Article therefore assumes that the number of drivers is fixed. Prior
scholarship suggests that when the activity level varies, tort law may not be efficient.
Specifically, Brian Hindley and William Bishop have shown that when the expected
number of accidents depends on the total number of people engaged in the activity, none
of the standard liability rules can be used to induce the efficient level of the activity;
instead, too many people will drive. Hindley & Bishop, Accident Liability Rules and
Externality, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 60-61 (1983); see Shaven, supra note 11. Hindley
and Bishop's analysis suggests that the standard tort rules considered here also may fail
to induce individuals to engage in the efficient level of activity in the single activity
accident context. Their analysis, however, does not alter the conclusions of this Article
that the standard tort rules can induce efficient care-taking and risk spreading. Nor does
their analysis alter the central claim of this Article: those interested in efficient tort
rules should shift their attention to bilateral risk models.
110. Specifically, the model assumes that individuals suffer the same extent of physical
injury. Appendix II addresses the situation in which individuals face the same expected
accident losses prior to the accident but may in fact suffer different injuries should the
accident occur. Appendix II demonstrates that the results obtained in this Article do not
depend on the assumption that parties to an accident suffer identical losses. The final
results obtained in Appendix II are identical to those obtained here. See supra note 30.
For further discussion of the assumption that those involved in an accident suffer the
same physical injury, see infra note 177.
Neither the text nor the appendices address the issue of efficient damages when the
parties to an accident suffer the same injury but one is injured in a more painful manner
than the other-for example, one party is conscious during the injury and the other is
unconscious. For a discussion of this issue in the context of wrongful death, see Leebron,
Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256
(1989).
111. The term "pecuniary loss" is defined at supra note 64.
112. Utility functions that are altered by the occurrence of a particular event are called
"state-dependent" utility functions and are essential to the accurate mathematical characterization of a serious permanent physical injury. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9,
at 228-35, 245-54; Cooter, supra note 33, at 388-91; Friedman, supra note 5, at 85-86; see
Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 146.
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any given level of wealth.113 It also is assumed that the injury
affects the individual's ability to use incremental additions to his
wealth to produce utility; that is, it affects his marginal utility
4
of wealth."
To see these two consequences, consider an individual who is
rendered a permanent quadriplegic by an automobile accident.
The injury clearly produces pecuniary losses in the form of
increased medical expenses and the loss of expected future earnings. In addition, the injury has nonpecuniary consequences in
that it alters the victim's ability to use wealth to derive utility;
in other words, it alters his utility function. First, the injury
makes the victim worse off: at any given level of wealth, the
victim would be happier healthy than he is as a quadriplegic. In
addition, the injury affects the way in which the victim can use
wealth to derive utility. For example, the quadriplegic who once
derived pleasure from purchasing and using running shoes, skiing
in the Alps, and driving sports cars no longer values such
commodities and instead values wheelchairs and voice-activated
computers." 5 Incorporating the direct impact of the injury on the
victim's utility function is essential to an accurate mathematical
representation of the effects of physical injury. 1 6 This model is
one of the few models of accidents between strangers" 7 to incorporate this direct impact;" S it is the only model of bilateral risk
accidents to do so." 9

113. In other words, it is assumed that at any given level of wealth, each individual
would rather be healthy than injured.
114. In addition, the model assumes that the absence of injury, in other words that
health, is a "normal good." A commodity is a normal good if increases in the individual's
wealth, ceteris paribus,result in an increase in the individual's demand for that commodity;
most commodities are normal goods. See Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 146. Thus,
when a commodity is a normal good, the maximum amount an individual would pay for
that commodity also increases with wealth. See Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 147 &
n.9. This model assumes that the wealthier the individual, the more he will be willing to
spend to avoid injury.
115. The direct impact of a physical injury on the victim's utility function is discussed
in greater detail in S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 10; Cooter, supra note 33; and Friedman,

supra note 5.
116. E.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 228-35, 245-54; Cooter, supra note 33, at 388-91;
Friedman, supra note 5, at 85-86; see Cook & Graham,.supra note 64, at 146.
117. See supra note 10.
118. Most of the early economic models of the tort system did not employ state-

dependent utility functions. E.g., Brown, supra note 11; Diamond, supra note 25; Landes
& Posner, supra note 11; Shaven, supra note 11. Moreover, even some recent discussions

of efficient accident law for personal injuries do not incorporate state-dependent utility
functions. E.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 9, ch. 9 (discussing catastrophic
personal injuries by using a model that treats the loss associated with an accident as a
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As do Diamond's model and most of the economic analyses
employing the orthodox unilateral risk model, 120 this model assumes that all accidents involve only two individuals, each of
whom is engaged in the same activity. 121 It also assumes that the
probability of an accident between any two people depends only
on each of the individual's expenditures on accident prevention,
or "care." The expected number of accidents in which any given
individual will be involved thus depends on that individual's level
of care, the number of other persons engaged in the activity, and
the amount of care that each of the other individuals takes. The
model assumes that increased expenditures on care lower the
number of accidents in which the individual can expect to be
involved. Increased care-taking, however, 22also lowers the benefit
1
an individual receives from the activity.
As in both the orthodox model of accidents and in Diamond's
model, this model assumes that individuals and courts possess

purely pecuniary loss). Because nonpecuniary loss is an important element of the impact
of a serious physical injury, one cannot assume that the conclusions of these analyses
apply to accidents resulting in physical injury or death. Recent economic analyses of
physical injury between strangers that take into account the impact on the utility function
include: S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 228-35, 245-54; Fraser, supra note 9; Friedman,
supra note 5, at 85-86; see Cooter, supra note 33, at 388-91 (employing state-dependent
utility functions to argue for a market in unmatured tort claims); cf. Cook & Graham,
supra note 64, at 146 (describing the impact on the utility function of the loss of an
irreplaceable commodity). These articles, however, are all unilateral risk analyses.
119. Previous economic analyses of bilateral risks restrict themselves to injuries that
result in purely pecuniary losses. E.g., Arlen, supra note 25; Diamond, supra note 25;
Leong, supra note 25; Ordover, Costly Litigation, supra note 25.
120. E.g., Brown, supra note 11; Landes & Posner, supra note 11; Shavell, supra note
11. But see S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 164-67 (discussing efficient tort rules for purely
pecuniary losses resulting from multiple tortfeasors in a unilateral risk model); Landes
& Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517
(1980) (same).
121. In other words, it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that individuals engaging
in this activity impose costs only on others also engaging in the activity; no one else is
affected. This assumption that third parties are not affected is a standard assumption of
economic models of accidents. E.g., Brown, supra note 11; Fraser, supra note 9; Landes
& Posner, supra note 11; Shavell, supra note 11. To the extent that the activity being
considered does have an impact on third parties, the issue of efficient tort rules for
accidents resulting in injury to those third parties is better analyzed in a two-activity
accident model. The multipart study of physical injuries, of which this Article is the first
part, will include an economic analysis of efficient tort rules for physical injuries resulting
from two-activity accidents.
122. This assumption that the benefit of the activity is a decreasing function of care
is consistent with the observation that, although both expending resources to maintain
a car and driving more slowly reduce the probability of an accident, both efforts at
taking care are costly. The former is costly because it requires a direct expenditure of
wealth. The latter is costly because it increases travel time, which in turn decreases the
time that can be spent in other activities, such as income-producing activities.
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perfect information that they obtain without cost. It assumes
that litigation and settlement costs are zero, 123 that tortfeasors
pay damages only if an individual suffers a physical injury, 124 and
that people with identical injuries collect identical damages. 25 To
spread risks, people can purchase accident insurance 26 and liability insurance' 27 in perfect and fair insurance markets. 2s The
model further assumes that the collateral source rule applies;
thus, the tort victim's receipt of insurance benefits does not
affect the amount of damages he can collect from the tortfeasor.
No-fault insurance laws do not apply to the physical injuries
considered here.' 29 Finally, this model assumes that the alternative to the tort system is a system that permits only voluntary
exchanges; that each individual is initially entitled to be free
from the risk of injury imposed by others engaging in the activity
in question; 130 and that transaction costs are sufficiently high to
13
preclude voluntary exchanges. '
B.

The Efficient Equilibrium

The threshold question in an analysis of tort rules under the
Pareto criterion is whether the rules are Pareto superior in that

123. For a discussion of litigation costs in the single activity accident context, see
Ordover, Costly Litigation, supra note 25 (expanding Diamond's single activity accident
model to include litigation costs). See also Epstein, supra note 29, at 779-84 (discussing
the relative administrative costs of fault and no-fault rules for automobile accidents).
124. In other words, only ex post damage rules are considered. See supra text accompanying notes 83-93.
125. The assumption that individuals with identical losses collect identical damages is
consistent with the current law governing damage awards for serious permanent injury.
See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 540 (1973).
126. This Article uses the term "accident insurance" to refer to all first-party coverage
for losses to the insured resulting from an accident. The term accident insurance thus
includes medical insurance against medical expenses resulting from an accident, disability
insurance and other forms of insurance against the loss of future wages, and accidental
death and dismemberment insurance which provides coverage based on the nature of the
injury suffered ($x for the loss of an arm; $y for total blindness).
127. This Article uses the term "liability insurance" to refer to all forms of insurance
coverage for damages owed to third parties.
128. Insurance markets are fair and perfect when all parties possess perfect information
and when the premium charged by insurance companies equals the companies' expected
liability on the insurance policy. The assumption that all parties are perfectly informed
avoids the moral hazard problem that otherwise would be present. See infra note 148
(discussing the assumption that insurance markets are complete).
129. This Article ignores no-fault laws because they do not apply to the serious
permanent injuries considered here. See supra note 29.
130. See supra text accompanying note 9.
131. This model assumes that transaction costs are high because otherwise no reason
for the tort system would exist; individuals would achieve the efficient solution through
voluntary exchanges. See Coase, supra note 46.
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they increase the expected utility of at least one individual
engaged in the activity but do not make anyone worse off than
he would be otherwise, when only voluntary exchanges are permitted. 13 2 When only voluntary exchanges are permitted, but high
transaction costs preclude such exchanges, no one would be able
to engage in the risky activity. Given this, in the case of the
single activity accidents, each of the standard tort rules is Pareto
superior to a world in which only voluntary transactions are
permitted because they present the possibility of welfare-improving exchanges of entitlements (here, risk of injury) and do not
threaten to make anyone worse off. The condition that no one
be made worse off than he would be otherwise is automatically
satisfied because each individual chooses whether to accept the
benefits and costs of a tort rule when he chooses whether to
engage in the activity. Those who choose to engage in the activity
reveal themselves to be better off under the tort rules than they
would be otherwise when they are not permitted to engage in
the activity and thus do not bear its risks. Those who do not
engage in the activity are as well off as they would be in the
absence of tort rules because only those who engage in the
activity bear its risks and obtain its benefits. 133 Accordingly, in
the single activity accident context, unlike in the unilateral risk
context, each of the standard tort rules is Pareto superior. There
is no requirement that those who are injured be fully compensated for their losses.
The question remains whether any of the standard tort rules
are Pareto efficient. Because in this model individuals are identically situated ex ante, Pareto efficient tort rules are those that
induce the equilibrium at which the expected utility of any one
individual is maximized. An individual's expected utility is determined by the amount of care the individual takes, which affects
both the benefit he gets from the activity and his probability of

132. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 50-51.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. The conclusion that tort rules do not
make individuals worse off follows from the assumption that only those who engage in
the activity bear a risk of injury from others who also engage in the activity and from
the conclusion that, absent the tort system, no one would be permitted to engage in the
activity. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24, 102. Although the first assumption is
arguably unrealistic, it is consistent with the assumption of the unilateral risk model that
all accidents occur between injurers and victims. The use of this assumption thus serves
the purpose of this Article, which is to determine whether, at the same level of abstraction
employed in the unilateral risk model, shifting the focus to bilateral risks solves the
problems for Pareto efficiency. Future analysis considers the effect of tort rules on those
engaged in other activities.
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being injured; the amount of care other individuals take, which
also affects his probability of being injured; and the individual's
ability to spread the risk of injury, for example, through the
purchase of accident insurance. 3 4 The efficient equilibrium thus
is determined by finding the equilibrium levels of care and risk
spreading, taken by each individual, which maximize the expected
utility of any given individual.13 5 A tort rule is efficient if it
induces each individual to take the efficient level of care and to
136
engage in efficient risk spreading.
As is shown in Appendix I, maximizing the expected utility of
an individual engaged in the activity yields the two conditions
for a Pareto efficient equilibrium: the condition for the efficient
level of care and the condition for efficient risk spreading. 3 7
These two conditions for the efficient equilibrium are the standard conditions for efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading.138 The efficient equilibrium level of care is the level at which
the social marginal cost of care of an individual's care-taking
equals the social marginal benefit of his care. 39 Risk spreading
is efficient when each individual purchases the insurance coverage
at which he derives the same utility from an additional dollar of
wealth-that is, the same marginal utility of wealth-whether
40
he is injured or uninjured.

134. See supra note 55 (discussing risk spreading).
135. See Diamond, sup'a note 25, at 114. Because individuals are assumed to be identical,
this Article restricts its analysis to those equilibria at which all individuals take the
same level of care, referred to here as "uniform equilibria." A uniform equilibrium is the
equilibrium that occurs when all individuals engage in the same behavior. Id. Thus, the
efficient uniform equilibrium level of care is the level of care which, if taken by everyone,
maximizes the expected utility of each person in equilibrium. Id. at 115. The efficient
level of accident insurance coverage is the level that maximizes each individual's expected
utility at the efficient equilibrium level of care. In other words, the efficient uniform
equilibrium levels of care and accident insurance are the levels of care and insurance
coverage that maximize expected utility as given by Equation (1) in Appendix I, infra p.
92.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55. Coincidentally, given that the expected
utility of each individual is maximized at the Pareto efficient equilibrium, in the single
activity accident context Pareto efficient tort rules also are those that maximize total
social expected utility. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 115 (employing a total social
welfare notion of efficiency). The Pareto efficiency criterion is used here instead of the
social utility maximization criterion that Diamond used because Pareto efficiency avoids
the problems inherent in making interpersonal comparisons of utility. See supra note 40.
See generally L. ROBBINS, supra note 6; A. SEN, supra note 6, ch. 9; Cooter, supra note 4,
at 820-21. Also, many consider the Pareto criterion to be fair. See supra text accompanying
note 5.
137. See infra Equations (1)3) in Appendix I, p. 92.
138. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 10; supra text accompanying notes 67-80.
139. See infra Equation (2) and subsequent discussion in Appendix I, p. 92.
140. See infra Equations (1)(3) and accompanying analysis in Appendix I, pp. 91-93.
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As "due care" in an efficient tort system equals the efficient
level of care for purposes of determining both negligence and
contributory negligence, the condition for efficient care-taking
warrants more discussion. As Appendix I shows, the social marginal cost of care is the cost to the individual in question of
taking care, specifically, the decrease in the benefit that the
individual receives from the activity resulting from his additional
expenditure on care. 141 The social marginal benefit of care is the
benefit to the individual in question, and to the other participants
in the activity, of the decrease in the probability of an accident
42
that results from an increase in the individual's care-taking.
The efficient level of care is therefore the level at which the
social marginal cost of care, as measured by the resulting reduced
benefit of the activity to the individual, equals the social marginal
benefit of care, as measured by the benefit to the individual in
question and the other individuals in society of the reduction in
the expected number of accidents resulting from an increase in
43
this one individual's care-taking.
Observe that the efficient equilibrium level of care is based on
the social marginal costs and benefits of care as perceived by
participants in the activity and as determined by the impact on
their expected utility; it is not determined, as proponents of the
Hand formula suggest, by balancing the monetary benefits and
costs of an individual's expenditures on care. 44 Observe, in addition, that whereas in the unilateral risk case certain circumstances exist under which the efficient expected number of
accidents is zero, 45 in the bilateral risk case efficient care-taking
is uniformly associated with a positive expected number of accidents. This conclusion follows from the fact that the social marginal benefit of care invariably is finite and declining; thus,
beyond some point, less than the point at which no accidents
46
occur, the benefits of additional care do not justify the costs.

The condition for efficient care-taking is consistent with the condition Diamond obtained
in his analysis of single activity accidents that result in purely pecuniary losses. Diamond,
supra note 25, at 115. Diamond did not consider efficient risk spreading.
141. See infra Equation (2) in Appendix I, p. 92.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Thus, the efficient level of care cannot be determined, as the Hand formula implies
and as proponents of wealth maximization suggest, by weighing the monetary costs and
benefits of care.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75, 81-82.
146. The social marginal benefit of care is based on the total utility an individual
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The second condition for Pareto efficiency-the achievement
of efficient risk spreading-is governed by the standard condition
for efficient risk spreading: Has the individual allocated his
wealth between his life when he is healthy and his life when he
is injured (through, for example, the purchase of insurance) so
that he derives the same benefit from the last dollar of wealth
whether he is injured or healthy? 47 As explained previously,
because a serious physical injury involves a nonpecuniary loss,
less than full insurance coverage satisfies this condition in the
bilateral risk case as in the unilateral risk case.148 In other words,
full coverage against this injury, defined as insurance in an
amount sufficient to leave the victim as well off injured as he
would be healthy, is not efficient. 149 In the unilateral risk model,

derives from being healthy, as opposed to being injured or dead. See infra Equation (2)
in Appendix I, p. 92. Although an individual might require infinite compensation before
he would agree to being rendered permanently comatose, the total utility he derives
from life while healthy, and thus the cost to him of being comatose as opposed to healthy,
is finite. Id. Thus, the social marginal benefit of care is finite.
In addition, it should be observed that, because in the single activity accident context
accident victims do not need to be fully compensated monetarily to be no worse off than
otherwise, see supra text accompanying notes 132-33, infinite damages, and thus a zero
accident rate, are never required. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 67-80 and Equation (3) in Appendix I, p. 92.
148. Appendix I presents the proof of this conclusion at infra note 248. See supra text
accompanying notes 76-80 (discussing efficient risk spreading in the unilateral risk context).
Appendix I's mathematical analysis of efficient risk spreading implicitly assumes that
insurance markets are complete, even though this assumption is completely unrealistic.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-90. Appendix I assumes that insurance markets
are complete purely for ease of analysis. This assumption is not essential to the present
analysis, and the conclusions derived in Appendix I generally hold even when insurance
markets are not complete. See infra note 209. The only circumstance in which incomplete
insurance markets affect the conclusions of this Article is when the efficient level of
accident insurance coverage is negative. Even when efficient insurance is negative,
however, incomplete insurance markets preclude only efficient risk spreading; even with
negative efficient insurance coverage and incomplete insurance markets, here the tort
system always can induce efficient care-taking. Id. In contrast, Friedman's analysis
depends on the assumption that insurance markets are complete. Friedman, supra note
5.
149. Although efficient insurance coverage is less than full insurance coverage for
serious permanent injuries, the precise amount of efficient coverage cannot be determined
because a serious permanent physical injury affects the victim's marginal utility of wealth
in unpredictable ways. In fact, the possibility that efficient insurance coverage is negative
cannot be ruled out. See infra note 209. Nevertheless, Alan Schwartz argues that damages
in products liability cases should equal the victim's purely pecuniary losses on the grounds
that pecuniary losses equal the efficient level of insurance coverage for such injuries. See
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 362-63. Schwartz claims that intuition indicates that rational
individuals would fully insure against pecuniary losses but would want little or no coverage
against the purely nonpecuniary element of a serious permanent physical injury. Id. at
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the conclusion that full insurance coverage is not efficient led to
the conclusion that tort rules-in particular, strict liability rulescannot induce both efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading. 5 ' As will be shown, in the case of single activity accidents,
this difficulty disappears; no conflict exists between efficient caretaking and efficient risk spreading.
C. The No-Liability Equilibrium
Before examining the standard tort rules, a consideration of
whether tort liability is necessary for Pareto efficiency is useful.
Specifically, it is useful to consider whether Pareto efficiency is
possible under a tort rule that permits individuals to engage in
the activity without having to pay damages for injuries they
364-67; accord Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987). This claim that the efficient amount of insurance is equal to the pecuniary
loss is correct, however, only if each individual's marginal utility of wealth is equal when
he is injured and uninjured (that is, only if the physical injury has no impact on the
victim's marginal utility of wealth). There is no reason to believe, however, that serious
permanent injuries have no impact on the marginal utility of wealth.
First, current insurance markets suggest that physical injuries affect the victim's
marginal utility of wealth and that, for some people, the efficient amount of insurance
exceeds the victim's pecuniary losses. Specifically, in a world of rational individuals, were
Schwartz correct one would not expect to find insurance companies offering insurance
against nonpecuniary losses because demand for such insurance would not exist. The
current structure of insurance markets reveals that coverage against nonpecuniary losses
is currently available. An individual can insure against pecuniary losses resulting from
an accident by purchasing disability insurance against lost expected wages, medical
insurance against medical expenses, and, in the case of car accidents, collision insurance
against damage to his car. In addition to' this coverage against pecuniary losses, the
individual can purchase accidental death or dismemberment coverage. Accidental death
or dismemberment insurance provides benefits for an accident victim based on the nature
of the harm he suffers, irrespective of pecuniary losses. When purchased in addition to
coverage against pecuniary losses, this type of coverage allows an individual to obtain
coverage for nonpecuniary losses. See generally E. VAUGHN & C. ELLIOTT, FUNDAMENTALS
OF RISK AND INSURANCE (2d ed. 1978). In addition, in the case of automobile accidents,
individuals can purchase "uninsured motorist coverage." This insurance provides benefits
when the other party to the accident is uninsured or underinsured equal to the damages
the insured is legally entitled to recover for his bodily injury. As these damages include
recovery for pain and suffering, a nonpecuniary loss, in addition to recovery for lost
expected wages and medical expenses, the purchase of uninsured motorist coverage
enables the insured to obtain coverage for some of his nonpecuniary losses.
In addition to this analysis of insurance markets, recent empirical analysis suggests
that physical injury does affect the victim's marginal utility of income. Viscusi & Evans,
Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 353, 371 (1990). Although Viscusi and Evans conclude that the efficient
level of insurance is less than the victim's pecuniary loss, id. at 371-72, their study is
only the first study of the issue. Additional empirical analysis is needed before one can
conclude whether efficient insurance ever exceeds purely pecuniary losses.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.

1990]

PERSONAL INJURY

cause. This Article refers to this tort rule as a "no-liability rule"

and to the equilibrium that results under this rule as the "no151
liability equilibrium.)

Under a no-liability rule, each individual bears his own expected

152
accident costs but does not bear the accident costs of others.

The no-liability equilibrium thus occurs at the level of care and
the level of insurance coverage that maximize an individual's
expected utility when he bears his own accident costs but does
not have to pay for the accident costs of others. 1 The no-liability
equilibrium is efficient only if a system of no-liability rules induces
individuals to take the efficient level of care and to engage
efficiently in risk spreading.
As explained previously, care-taking is efficient when each
individual takes the level of care at which the social marginal
cost of care equals the social marginal benefit of care.

54

The no-

liability equilibrium level of care is the level at which the marginal cost of care to each individual equals his marginal benefit
of care, absent tort liability to others. Thus, for the no-liability
equilibrium to be efficient, the marginal cost and benefit of care
that each individual faces in the absence of tort liability must
equal the social marginal cost and benefit of care. Because the
individuals who take care are the only people adversely affected
by.the care-taking, the social marginal cost of care taken by an
individual is simply the marginal cost to that individual of his
expenditures on care.15 The social marginal cost of care thus
equals the private marginal cost of care to the individual in the
absence of liability rules. The social marginal benefit of care,
however, does not equal the marginal benefit of care to an
individual in the absence of liability rules. As discussed previously, the social marginal benefit of care is the benefit to both
the individual in question and the other participants in the
activity of the reduction in expected accidents resulting from the
151. Again, this Article restricts the discussion to uniform equilibria. The no-liability
equilibrium level of care is thus the care level that a rational utility-maximizing individual
would choose to take when he is not liable for damages and when he believes that all
other individuals also are taking that same level of care. See Diamond, supra note 25, at
114.
152. See Brown, supra note 11, at 328, 337; Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 872-73.
153. Equation (4) in Appendix I presents the expected utility of an individual who is
not liable for any injuries to others. See infra Appendix I, p. 94. Equations (5) and (6) in
Appendix I present the conditions for the no-liability equilibrium. See infra Appendix I,
p. 94.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
155. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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individual's increased expenditures on care. 156 Under a no-liability

rule, however, the marginal benefit to each individual of his caretaking is simply the direct benefit to him of the resulting reduction in the expected number of accidents. Because the individual
is not liable for the costs he imposes on others, he derives no
benefit from, and thus will not take into account, the impact of
his care-taking on the expected accident costs of others. Accordingly, because under the no-liability rule each individual bears
the full social cost of taking care but receives only part of the
social benefits, his incentives to take care are inadequate, and
he will take less care than is efficient. 57 Thus, even though each
individual who imposes risk on others bears an equal risk of
harm to himself, the tort system cannot attain Pareto efficiency
158
absent the threat of liability for the losses that others sustain.
D. Efficient Tort Liability Rules for Single Activity Accidents
The discussion above raises the issue of whether any of the
four standard tort rules 59 are Pareto efficient in that they can
be used to induce efficient care-taking and risk spreading under
the bilateral risk model that this Article employs.

60

This issue

is particularly important because none of these tort rules satisfy
the Pareto criterion under the unilateral risk model: negligence
liability rules are not Pareto superior to a system of purely
voluntary transactions,'16 and strict liability rules are not Pareto

efficient because they induce efficient care-taking only at the
expense of efficient risk spreading 62 and because under certain
1 63
circumstances efficient damages are infinite.

1. Pure Strict Liability
Pure strict liability permits individuals to engage in the activity
provided that each party to any accident that occurs pays the
156. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
157. See infra note 253. The text following Equation (6) in Appendix I discusses the
no-liability equilibrium level of risk spreading. See infra Appendix I, pp. 94-95.
158. Given that, as will be shown, three negligence-inclusive liability rules are Pareto
efficient, the fact that the no-liability equilibrium is not Pareto efficient implies (in the
context of this model) that the three negligence-inclusive liability rules are Pareto superior
to a rule of no-liability.
159. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
160. Because this Article has already determined that all four tort rules are Pareto
superior to a system of purely voluntary transactions, the only issue considered here is
whether they are Pareto efficient.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
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other for his injuries according to an award schedule that the
damage rules determine. Because this single activity accident
model assumes that each party to an accident suffers the same
injury,164 under pure strict liability the parties to an accident are
reciprocally liable to each other for the same amount of damages.

65

In other words, regardless of each individual's expendi-

tures on care, in the event of an accident each party is reciprocally
and identically liable to the other for damages, and damages paid
and received always net to zero. 166 Because the parties to an

accident neither pay nor receive net damages, each individual's
expected utility under strict liability equals his expected utility
were he not liable at all.

67

In other words, each individual has

the same expected utility under a rule of pure strict liability
that he would have under a rule of no-liability. Thus, the equilibrium resulting under pure strict liability is the no-liability equilibrium. Accordingly, because the no-liability equilibrium is
inefficient,1 6 the pure strict liability equilibrium is also inefficient.

69

This result, that under pure strict liability care-taking is inefficient and risk spreading is efficient, differs from the result
obtained by the orthodox analysis of pure strict liability: strict
liability can induce either efficient care-taking or efficient risk
spreading, but not both.170 This contrast, although interesting,

does not present us with the possibility of Pareto efficient tort
rules. We proceed, therefore, to consider the three remaining
tort liability rules-pure negligence, negligence with contributory

164. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the application of
pure strict liability to a situation in which individuals do not necessarily suffer the same
injury, see Appendix II, supra note 30 (demonstrating that pure strict liability is not
efficient).
165. The conclusion that the parties are awarded identical, offsetting damages flows
from the assumption that damage rules are such that parties with identical injuries
receive identical damage awards. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166. Damages paid always equal damages received so long as one ignores the problem
of judgment-proof defendants, as do this model and most analyses under the unilateral
risk model. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 327; Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at
874; ef Diamond, supra note 25, at 109 (analyzing single activity accidents under the
assumption that neither party to an accident is judgment-proof).
167. See infra the discussion of pure strict liability in Appendix I, p. 96.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58 and infra the discussion following
Equations (5-(6) in Appendix I, pp. 94-95.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 256-58; accord Diamond, supra. note 25, at 117
(arguing that pure strict liability does not result in efficient care-taking for single activity
accidents resulting in purely pecuniary losses). Pure strict liability is also inefficient when
individuals have identical expected accident costs but may in fact suffer different injuries
should an accident result. See supra note 30.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
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negligence, and strict liability with contributory negligence 7 'to determine whether they are Pareto efficient under the single
activity accident model.
2. Negligence-Inclusive Liability Rules
This Article considers the remaining tort rules together under
the term "negligence-inclusive liability rules" because under each
of these rules an individual can dramatically affect his expected
costs, either as a potential injurer or as a potential victim, by
being nonnegligent; that is, by taking due care. The question
presented is whether any of these rules are Pareto efficient. This
discussion assumes that due care for purposes of both negligence
and contributory negligence equals the efficient equilibrium level
172
of care.
In the unilateral risk context, none of these rules satisfy the
Pareto criterion, but for different reasons. Neither pure negligence nor negligence with contributory negligence is Pareto
superior because these liability rules leave potential victims
worse off than they would have been otherwise.173 Strict liability
rules, including strict liability with contributory negligence, are
not Pareto efficient because they cannot induce both efficient
care-taking and efficient risk spreading; 174 moreover, in some
75
cases efficient damages under strict liability rules are infinite.
As shown below, these familiar conclusions as to the inefficiency of negligence-inclusive liability rules are not general conclusions about negligence-inclusive liability rules. They are, rather,
conclusions about tort rules as applied to the unilateral risk
model; they do not hold for single activity accidents. Analysis of
the single activity accident model reveals three different conclusions. First, in contrast with the unilateral risk case, the three
negligence-inclusive liability rules are identically efficient: when
any one of the rules is efficient, the others are efficient, and
should one rule be inefficient, the others will be as well. Second,
in the case of single activity accidents, the three negligenceinclusive liability rules can induce both efficient care-taking and

171. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
172. This assumption is standard in law and economics models. See, e.g., Brown, supra
note 11, at 332; Diamond, supra note 25, at 114; Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 868;
Shavell, supra note 11, at 10.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
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efficient risk spreading. Finally, optimal tort rules for single
activity accidents never require infinite damages.
The conclusion that the three negligence-inclusive liability rules
are identically efficient follows from the fact that the individual's
expected utility is identical regardless of which of the three
negligence-inclusive liability rules are employed. 176 The conclusion
that each individual's expected utility is identical under each of
the three negligence-inclusive liability rules follows from the
assumption that each party to an accident suffers the same
physical injury. 177 Given this assumption, each negligence-inclusive liability rule results in an individual owing damages on net
only when one party is negligent and the other is not; when both
parties to an accident are either negligent or nonnegligent, nei178
ther party owes or receives damages on net.
Because the individual's expected utility function is the same
under each of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules, it is
not necessary to differentiate between the three rules to determine whether any of them are Pareto efficient. The condition
that renders any one of the negligence-inclusive tort rules Pareto
efficient renders them all Pareto efficient. 1 79 Whether these three

176. See infra Equation (7) in Appendix I, pp. 97-98. The fact that the individual's
expected utility is the same under each of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules
produces, but is not essential for, the conclusion that the three liability rules are identically
efficient. Appendix II shows that when individuals may suffer different injuries should
an accident occur, each individual's expected utility differs under the three negligenceinclusive liability rules, yet the three negligence-inclusive liability rules are nevertheless
identically efficient. See supra note 30.
177. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. This assumption that both parties
suffer the same injury is less artificial than it might at first seem once the focus shifts
from disequilibrium conditions to the situation of the parties at the uniform equilibrium.
At the uniform equilibrium, each individual engaged in the activity takes the same level
of care. See supra note 135 (discussing uniform equilibria). It is not unreasonable to
assume that when individuals are taking the same level of care, those involved in an
accident will reasonably expect to suffer the same injuries. Moreover, this assumption
that the injuries are the same produces, but is not essential to, the conclusion that the
three negligence-inclusive liability rules are identically efficient. See supra note 176.
178. See infra Equation (7) in Appendix I, pp. 97-98.
179. See id. This conclusion, that if negligence with contributory negligence is efficient
then pure negligence is also, contrasts with Diamond's results regarding the relative
efficiency of pure negligence and negligence with contributory negligence as applied to
purely pecuniary losses resulting from single activity accidents. In his analysis of single
activity accidents, Diamond suggested that pure negligence will not be efficient because
pure negligence has the "unsatisfactory nature" that when both individuals are negligent,
the damages each individual owes and the damages he is entitled to receive net to zero.
From this, Diamond concluded that pure negligence, like pure strict liability, does not
induce efficient care-taking. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 117. Negligence with contributory negligence, on the other hand, always will induce efficient behavior under full
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rules are identically Pareto efficient or -identically inefficient
remains to be seen.
Whether all three negligence-inclusive liability rules are Pareto
efficient depends on whether these rules can induce an equilibrium at which each individual takes the efficient level of care
and engages in efficient risk spreading. 180 Under the negligenceinclusive liability rules, two possible equilibria exist: one at which
all individuals are negligent, the negligent equilibrium, and one
at which each individual takes care greater than or equal to due
care, the nonnegligent equilibrium .'8 For the negligence-inclusive
liability rules to be efficient, one of these equilibria must occur
at the efficient equilibrium.
Consider first the negligent equilibrium. Under the negligenceinclusive liability rules, when both parties to an accident are
negligent, each is liable to the other for damages. Because the
parties suffer identical injuries, however, their net liability is
zero. Each individual's expected utility when everyone is negligent is therefore identical to his expected utility under the noliability rule. 182 The negligent equilibrium accordingly occurs at
183
the no-liability equilibrium, which is inefficient.
Consider now the nonnegligent equilibrium. Under each of the
three negligence-inclusive liability rules, no one either receives
or pays net damages when all individuals are nonnegligent; under
both pure negligence and negligence with contributory negligence, no one is liable when both parties to an accident take due
care; under strict liability with contributory negligence, each
party is always liable to the other, but damages owed and
received net to zero. Given this, it might appear that the nonnegligent equilibrium also occurs at the no-liability equilibrium
and is inefficient. This conclusion, however, overlooks the fact
that the nonnegligent equilibrium is not simply the levels of care
and insurance that maximize the individual's expected utility
when no one is liable for damages. Rather, it is the level of care

compensation damage rules when due care is set equal to the efficient level of care. Id.
at 120. Diamond focused his analysis on negligence with contributory negligence, however,
and did not fully analyze pure negligence. The results of this Article suggest that
Diamond's analysis of pure negligence should be reexamined.
180. See supra note 135.
181. Once again we restrict our attention to the uniform equilibrium, at which all
individuals exercise the same level of care. See supra note 135.
182. Compare Equation (8), infra Appendix I, p. 99, with Equation (6), infra Appendix
I, p. 94.
183. See infra the discussion following Equations (4)-(6) and (8) in Appendix I, pp. 9495, 99.
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greater than or equal to due care and the level of insurance
coverage that maximize an individual's expected utility when all
others take the same level of care. 8 4 We have already determined
that the no-liability equilibrium level of care is less than the
efficient equilibrium level of care' 185 The no-liability equilibrium
is therefore less than due care. 186 Thus, the nonnegligent equilibrium cannot occur at the no-liability equilibrium because an
individual cannot take the no-liability equilibrium level of care
and be nonnegligent. Given this, it can be shown that each
individual maximizes his expected utility by taking the lowest
amount of care that enables him to be nonnegligent. 8 7 Each
individual, in other words, takes due care, which is equal to the
efficient level of care.'8 As for efficient risk spreading, under
each of the negligence-inclusive liability rules, neither party to
an accident receives or pays net damage awards when all individuals take the efficient level of care. 8 9 When care-taking is
efficient, therefore, damages do not affect an individual's ability
to efficiently spread the risk of loss through the purchase of
accident insurance. Accordingly, each individual, acting in his
own best interest, will purchase efficient insurance coverage
against the loss. 9 Thus, at the nonnegligent equilibrium, both
care-taking and risk spreading are efficient. 191 The possibility
therefore exists that the three negligence-inclusive liability rules
are efficient.
E.

Efficient Damage Rules

The employment of efficient liability rules is not enough to
realize this possibility of efficiency; damage rules also must be

184. See infra Equation (9) in Appendix I, p. 99.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 151-58 and infra note 253.
186. See supra note 172.
187. See infra Equations (9Y(12) in Appendix I, p. 99.
188. Id.
189. Damages paid and received under strict liability with contributory negligence
cancel out.
190. See infra the discussion following Equations (9-(12) in Appendix I, pp. 99-100.
Observe that the conclusion that under strict liability with contributory negligence risk
spreading is efficient at the nonnegligent equilibrium follows from the assumption that
the collateral source rule applies. Under this liability rule, net tort liability is zero and,
given the collateral source rule, the injured individual is able to achieve efficient risk
spreading through the purchase of insurance coverage. Thus, it is not the case, as some
have suggested, see Cooter, supra note 33, at 393, that the collateral source rule invariably
results in inefficient excessive compensation. Rather, circumstances exist, such as those
considered here, in which the collateral source rule is efficient.
191. See Cooter, supra note 33, at 393.
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efficient. Efficient damage rules are those that induce an equilibrium at which all individuals take the efficient level of care and
engage in efficient risk spreading. This Article previously showed
that the nonnegligent equilibrium is efficient and the negligent
equilibrium is not efficient. Thus, to induce efficient behavior,
damages must preclude an equilibrium at which all parties are
negligent and induce the nonnegligent equilibrium. 19
The requirement that damages preclude the negligent equilibrium and induce the nonnegligent equilibrium establishes two
conditions for efficient damage rules. To preclude the negligent
equilibrium, damages must be such that an individual who thinks
that everyone else is being negligent will nevertheless find it in
his own best interests to exercise due care. To induce the
nonnegligent equilibrium, damages must be such that an individual who thinks that everyone else is being nonnegligent will
himself choose to be nonnegligent.
As previously established, the negligent equilibrium occurs at
the no-liability equilibrium. 1 3 Accordingly, to satisfy the first
condition, damages must be such that an individual who believes
that others are taking the no-liability equilibrium level of care
will himself elect to take due care, which is the efficient level of
care. 94 To satisfy the second condition for efficient damages,
damages must induce the nonnegligent equilibrium, which occurs
at the efficient levels of care and insurance coverage. 195 To satisfy
this condition, damages must be such that an individual who
believes that everyone else is exercising due care will himself
decide to take due care. 19 Efficient damage awards include all
awards that equal or exceed the damage award necessary to
satisfy both conditions, which are based on the liability necessary

192. This approach to efficient damages views damages as a "cost" of behaving other
than as desired-in other words, as a sanction. It is therefore consistent with the approach
to efficient damages under negligence liability rules presented by Robert Cooter in
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 CoLuM. L. REV. 1523, 153840 (1984). Observe, however,
that here, where the risk is bilateral, the efficient damages rule under strict liability
with contributory negligence also is a "sanction," whereas in Cooter's unilateral risk
analysis, damages under a strict liability rule must equal the "price" of the injured
entitlement in order to be efficient. Id.
193. See infra Equation (8) in Appendix I, p. 99.
194. In other words, damages must equal or exceed the amount that satisfies Equation
(13) in Appendix I. See infra Appendix I, p. 101.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 184-91.
196. In other words, damages must equal or exceed the amount, D, that satisfies
Equation (14) in Appendix I. See infra Appendix I, p. 101.
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of exercising due care,
to induce an individual to incur the costs
97
instead of some lesser amount of care.'

This analysis suggests that efficient damages for physical injuries to strangers resulting from single activity accidents differ
substantially from those for physical injuries to strangers resulting from unilateral risks. In the unilateral risk context, in order
to satisfy the Pareto criterion, damage awards must fully compensate victims for the injuries they suffer. Full compensation
damages are necessary to ensure that tort rules do not make
victims worse off and to ensure that injurers exercise the efficient
level of care.198 By contrast, the above analysis demonstrates that
the three negligence-inclusive liability rules are optimal when
applied to single activity accidents, even without full compensation damages. 199 This Article previously showed that full compensation damages are not needed to ensure that victims are no
worse off than otherwise because tort rules for single activity
accidents do not operate to anyone's detriment. 200 Nor, as the
discussion above reveals, are full compensation damages necessary to induce efficient care-taking in the case of single activity
accidents. Minimum efficient damages for single activity accidents
are based on the amount necessary to induce the individual to
incur the costs of taking due care as opposed to taking a lesser
level of care.201 The full compensation value of the loss to the

197. See infra text accompanying Equations (13)-(15) in Appendix I, pp. 101-02. The
conclusion that the same damage rule induces efficiency under each of the negligenceinclusive liability rules holds even when individuals may suffer different injuries. See
supra note 30.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63, 76-80.
199. The conclusion that full compensation damages are not necessary for efficiency
contrasts dramatically with the conclusion of William Vickrey that, to induce efficient
care-taking for automobile accidents, each party to the accident should be charged the
full costs of the accident in that each party's damages should equal his own accident
costs plus the accident costs of others. See Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law,
Externalities, and Insurance:An Economist's Critique, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464,
465-67 (1968). His conclusion, which apparently was not derived using an explicit economic
model of automobile accidents, conflicts with both the conclusions of this Article and with
Diamond's conclusion that in the case of single activity accidents resulting in purely
pecuniary losses, full compensation damages are sufficient-albeit not necessary-to
induce efficient care-taking. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 116.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 and 132.
201. See supra text accompanying note 197 and Equations (13-(16) in Appendix I, pp.
101-03. The conclusion that efficient damages are the amount that induces the defendant
to take due care, instead of the amount that fully compensates the victim, is consistent
with that reached by Haddock, McChesney, & Spiegel, supra note 9, at 17-21. Analyzing
the issue of efficient risk taking in those situations in which a voluntary exchange
between potential injurers and potential victims is possible (for example, when transaction
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victim therefore is not relevant to the determination of efficient
damages, 20 2 and thus full compensation damages are not necessary
to induce efficient care-taking, even in the case of strict liability
with contributory negligence.
The fact that single activity accidents do not require full
compensation damages, as do unilateral risk accidents, leads to
a number of other essential differences between efficient tort
rules in the two situations. 20 3 In the unilateral risk context, the
full compensation requirement precludes pure negligence and
negligence with contributory negligence from being Pareto su-

costs are low), they conclude that when voluntary transactions are possible, tort rules
should induce injurers to bargain for the right to impose risk on the victim by dissuading
the potential injurer from opting for the involuntary exchanges that tort law permits.
To do this, they argue, damage rules for wrongful death should strive to strip away all
gains to the defendant from his actions (that is, should "make the defendant whole"),
rather than striving to make the victim "whole." Id. at 45-48. In the unilateral risk model
that the authors implicitly employ, their damage rule is Pareto efficient only in the cases
they explicitly consider: when prohibiting the imposition of risk without the potential
victim's consent is desirable (because, for example, voluntary exchange is possible). Their
analysis does not extend to the cases considered here, in which voluntary exchange is
not possible and the goal is to reduce, but not eliminate, the amount of the risk imposed.
202. See infra Equations (13)-(16) in Appendix I, pp. 101-02. We obtain the same result
when we assume that parties to an accident do not necessarily suffer the same injury.
See supra note 30.
This is not to say, however, that the full compensation value of the loss is irrelevant.
The cost to an individual of being injured, and not the efficient damage award, serves as
the basis for determining the standard of due care. Even here, however, the relevant
cost of the injury is the loss as the individual perceives it, not the full compensation
monetary value of the loss. See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
Although efficient damage awards do not depend on the full compensation value of the
loss, they may depend on the wealth of the defendant. In the single activity accident
context, the purpose of damage awards is to induce potential injurers to spend money
on taking due care. Here, the individual has two incentives to spend money on care: first,
his desire to avoid tort liability and second, his desire to reduce his own expected accident
costs. We previously assumed that an individual's wealth affects his willingness to spend
resources to avoid the risk of injury. See supra note 114. Given this assumption, the
individual's wealth will impact on the amount of care he will take to avoid injury to
himself. Thus, the wealthier he is, the more he will spend on care in the absence of tort
liability. This suggests that an individual's wealth will affect the size of the damage
award necessary to induce an individual to take due care. Consequently, current rules
precluding juries from taking into account the defendant's wealth in setting compensatory
damages should be reexamined. See Arlen, Should Defendant's Wealth Matter? 21 J. LEGAL
STUD.
(forthcoming 1992) (examining the role of wealth differences for accidents
resulting in purely pecuniary losses). But see Abraham & Jeffries, Punitive Damages and
the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 416-18 (1989)
(agreeing with the current law of compensatory tort damages that precludes consideration
of defendant's wealth based on an analysis that implicitly assumes that all losses are
purely pecuniary).
203. The analysis below suggests that although the same tort damage rules currently
govern unilateral risk and bilateral risk activities, efficiency may require different damage
rules for these two classes of activities.

1990]

PERSONAL INJURY

85

perior,20 4 creates a conflict under the strict liability rules between
efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading, 2 5 and raises the
possibility of infinite damage awards. 2 6 In the single activity
accident context, by contrast, none of these problems exist.
Single activity accidents do not require full compensation damages for Pareto superiority, and all three negligence-inclusive
liability rules, including pure negligence and negligence with
contributory negligence, are Pareto superior. Moreover, because
the primary purpose of damages in this context is to induce
efficient deterrence and not to compensate victims, no conflict
exists between efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading.
In the unilateral risk model, Pareto efficiency requires that
damages induce efficient care-taking and also compensate victims
for their losses. This requirement creates problems because the
nature of physical injuries is such that the damages that fully
compensate victims produce efficient care-taking but preclude
efficient risk spreading.2 07 In the single activity accident context,
by contrast, damage awards function as a sanction for failing to
exercise optimal care and not as a mechanism for compensating
the victim, 0 8 as demonstrated by the fact that under each of the
three negligence-inclusive liability rules no one receives net damage awards at the efficient equilibrium. Thus, regardless of the
magnitude of damage awards, at equilibrium, tort damages do
not interfere with the ability of individuals to spread the risk of
loss efficiently through the purchase of accident insurance. Both
risk spreading and care-taking are therefore efficient. 20 9 Further,

204. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
208. See supra note 192.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91; infra Equations (9W(12) and accompanying text in Appendix I, pp. 99-100. The conclusion that both care-taking and risk
spreading are efficient also holds when individuals do not suffer the same injury. See
supra note 30.
The conclusion as to efficient risk spreading must be qualified in one instance. An
examination of Equation (3), infra Appendix I, p. 92, reveals that it is theoretically
possible for the efficient equilibrium level of insurance to be negative. Should the efficient
level of insurance coverage be negative, tort rules can be used to induce the efficient
level of care. Individuals will not be able to achieve efficient risk spreading through the
use of private insurance markets, however, because insurance markets are incomplete.
Although the cases in which efficient insurance is negative are probably the exception,
these cases are not just a theoretical fantasy. For example, it would be efficient for an
individual facing the risk of being rendered permanently comatose to sell, rather than
purchase, insurance against this risk if his postaccident wealth exceeds the amount
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because efficient damages are based on the cost of care and not
on the monetary full compensation value of the loss, minimum
efficient damages for single activity accidents are never infinite. 210
Finally, in contrast with the unilateral risk case, the single
activity accident context raises no concern about excessive damages. In this context, the two above conditions for efficient
damages are the conditions for the minimum damage awards
necessary to induce efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading. Because in the single activity accident model, unlike in the
unilateral risk model, an individual can avoid all damage liability
by taking due care, damages are never too high.211 In other
words, this model presents no efficiency concern about excessive
damages .212
CONCLUSION

The apparent impossibility of formulating tort rules for serious
physical injuries to strangers that satisfy the Pareto criterion
has troubled scholars since their earliest efforts to apply economics to law. The requirement that victims be fully compensated
has precluded optimal tort rules, except in the unrealistic world
of ex ante damages or complete insurance markets. Although full
compensation damages are required for optimality in the unilateral risk context, this Article has shown that full compensation
of victims for their losses is not essential for optimality in the
class of bilateral risk activities known as single activity accidents.
Moreover, this Article has shown that, in the single activity
accident context, all three negligence-inclusive liability rules induce both efficient care-taking and efficient risk spreading, and
that a single damage rule induces efficiency under each of these
liability rules.

necessary to keep him alive-assuming he would prefer to be alive than dead. Even in
the single activity accident context, then, circumstances will exist under which efficient
risk spreading is unattainable as a practical matter. Theoretically, solutions to this
problem exist, such as complete insurance markets and a market in "unmatured tort
claims." The problems with such solutions are discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 89-93.
210. See infra Equations (13)-(15) in Appendix I, pp. 101-02. This conclusion follows
because the cost of being nonnegligent, as opposed to being negligent, is finite, and thus
the amount needed to induce the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium and to preclude the
negligent uniform equilibrium invariably will be finite.
211. See infra Equations (13)-(16) in Appendix I, pp. 101-02.
212. Although full compensation damages are not necessary for efficiency, in a perfect
world there is no efficiency argument against employing full compensation damages, or
some other damage award in excess of minimum efficient damages, in order to serve
some policy goal other than efficiency, so long as full compensation damages are possible.
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The optimality of the tort system in this context results from
the explicit recognition that the tort system does not, and need
not, function as an involuntary market in health in which damages
equal the value of the commodity destroyed. Rather, the tort
system is a set of abstract rules, applicable to all individuals,
that determine the conditions under which members of society
may engage in a risky activity. Under this view of the tort
system, the transaction permitted by the tort system is a nonmarket exchange in which individuals exchange the right to
impose risk on each other. Damages, instead of measuring the
price of an entitlement that another has taken involuntarily,
serve as the mechanism by which individuals ensure that their
fellows engage efficiently in the risky activity.
A question remains whether this analysis applies only to single
activity accidents or whether it extends to most, or indeed all,
bilateral risk activities. If the analysis applies only to single
activity accidents, then we know that efficiency is possible in the
single largest class of tort cases, but we have said little about
the efficiency of the tort system in general. If the conclusions of
this Article apply to bilateral risks generally, however, then a
reexamination of the orthodox economic approach to tort law is
in order. Addressing these issues will require considerable additional research on bilateral risks.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:41

APPENDIX I

This Appendix presents the basic single activity accident model
used in this Article and the proofs of the results discussed in
the text. Appendix 11213 extends the model to the situation in
which parties to an accident do not necessarily suffer the same
214
losses.
I.

THE MODEL

The model employed is based on Diamond's model of single
activity accidents, 215 extended here to risk-averse individuals who
face the possibility of suffering a serious permanent physical
injury. Following Diamond, it is assumed that the relevant world
is composed of a fixed 21 6 and large number (n + 1) of identical
risk-averse 21 7 individuals. Each individual is endowed with wealth,
W,218 and engages in an activity from which he derives a monetary
benefit, b(x). The enjoyment the person derives from engaging
in the activity is greater the lower his expenditures on efforts
to reduce accidents, referred to here as "care" and given by x. 219
Like automobile driving, this activity presents to those who
engage in it a risk of being injured in an accident with another
person. 220 As in Diamond's model, and as in most analyses employing the orthodox model, this analysis assumes that all accidents involve only two individuals. It also assumes that the

213. See supra note 30.
214. Id.
215. Diamond, supra note 25.
216. The present Article considers only the issues of efficient care-taking and risk
spreading. It does not consider the efficient level of activity, measured here by the
number of drivers. See supra note 109.
217. The assumption that individuals are risk-averse is one of the assumptions that
distinguishes this model from previous models of single activity accidents, all of which
assume that individuals are risk-neutral. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 107; Ordover,
Costly Litigation, supra note 25, at 247.
218. W represents both the monetary value of the bundle of all other commodities that
the individual possesses and the net present value of the individual's expected lifetime
income. This Article assumes that wealth differences do not exist. See Arlen, supra note
202, for an examination of the role of wealth differences in determining efficient tort
rules for accidents resulting in purely pecuniary losses.
219. Specifically, it is assumed that b(x) is a decreasing, twice-differentiable, concave
function of x. In other words, b'(x) < 0, b"(x) < 0 for all x. See Diamond, supra note 25,
at 113 n.8.
220. It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that individuals engaging in this activity
impose costs only on others engaging in the activity and that no one else is affected.
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probability of an accident between any two people depends only
on the amount of care that those individuals exercise. Thus, the
expected number of accidents between one person and another
(per unit time) is given by p(x,y), where, as before, x represents
the level of care taken by the individual in question and y
represents the level of care exercised by the other person. 221 The
expected number of accidents (per unit time) between a given
person and the n other people involved in the activity, each of
whom takes care level y, is np(x,y). 2
Should an accident occur between two people, both people
suffer the same serious permanent physical injury.m This physical injury has two distinct impacts on the victim: first, the injury
results in a pecuniary loss,2 and second, the injury directly
alters the victim's utility function. 225 The text describes the
nature of these two effects. The model represents these effects
mathematically as follows. The purely pecuniary loss is represented by a reduction of m in the injured individual's wealth,
where m is measured in dollars. The direct impact of the injury
on the victim's utility function is represented by the use of the
term U,(W) to describe the utility function of the individual when

221. It is assumed that the expected number of accidents declines, at a decreasing
rate, with increases in the care taken by either party to the accident: in other words,
that p,(xy), p(x,y) < 0, p1 ,(x,y), p.(x,y) > 0, and p,,(x,y)p.(x,y) - p, 2(x,y)2 > 0. In addition, it
is assumed that the higher the care level of one potential party to an accident, the lower
the impact on p(x,y) of a given increase in care by the other potential party, that is
p(x,y) > 0. It is also assumed that p(x,y) is symmetric in that p(x,y) = p(y,x), for all x,
y. This latter assumption follows because any accident that occurs between two individuals
occurs to each of them. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 114.
222. Because np(x,y) represents the expected number of accidents between one individual and another individual, as opposed to the probability of an accident between one
individual and another individual, np(x,x) does not have to be less than 1. As an empirical
matter, however, the expected number of accidents resulting in serious permanent
physical injury in which any given individual will be involved (per unit time) is less than
1. See E. Landes, supra note 29, at 254.
223. See supranote 110. Appendix 1I relaxes the assumption that the two parties suffer
the same physical injury, see supra note 30, and assumes that individuals face the same
expected accident losses prior to the accident but may in fact suffer different injuries
should the accident occur. Appendix H shows that this change in the model does not
alter the basic conclusions of this Article.
224. See supra note 64 for a definition of the term "pecuniary loss."
225. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 228-35, 245-54; Cooter, supra note 33, at
388-91; Friedman, supra note 5, at 85-86; see also Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 146
(describing the impact on the utility function of the loss of an irreplaceable commodity).
The assumption that the injury affects the victim's marginal utility of wealth is consistent
with recent empirical analysis of utility functions that depend on health. Viscusi & Evans,
supra note 149, at 371.
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26
healthy and U2(W) to describe his utility function once injured.
It is assumed that an individual is better off healthy than injured
(i.e., U,(W) > U 2(W)). In addition, it is assumed that the injury
affects the individual's ability to use incremental additions to his
wealth to produce utility; in other words, the injury affects the
victim's marginal utility of wealth. 227 Finally, the model assumes
that not being injured, in other words that health, is a "normal
good," which implies that the wealthier the individual becomes,
the more he will be willing to spend to avoid the possibility of
28
injury.
Both individuals and courts are assumed to possess perfect
information that is obtained costlessly. It also is assumed that
there are no litigation or settlement costs. 229 It is assumed that
one who imposes risk on another pays damages only if the other
suffers a physical injury20 and that people with identical injuries
collect identical damages, as in the current tort system.? 1 To
spread risks, people can purchase accident insurance2 2 and liability insurance23 in perfect and fair insurance markets.2 4 It is
assumed that the collateral source rule applies; thus, a tort
victim's receipt of insurance benefits does not affect the amount
of damages he can collect from the tortfeasor. It is further
assumed that no-fault insurance laws do not apply to the physical
injuries considered here. 5 Finally, it is assumed that the alter-

226. This notation is based on the following description of each individual's utility
function. Each individual's preferences can be represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(W,e), in which W is wealth and is measured in dollars and e is
the state variable and is not measured in dollars. It is assumed that e = 1 when the
individual is healthy, and e = 0 when the individual is injured. The notation that the
text employs is based on the following definitions:
U,(W)
U(W,1)
U2(W)
U(W,O).
See Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 146. The assumption that individuals are riskaverse implies that U,"(W) < 0 < U,(W), where i = 1,2.
227. See Cooter, supra note 33 (discussing the impact of an injury on the victim's
marginal utility of wealth).
228. See supra note 114.
229. For a discussion of litigation costs in the single activity accident context, see
Ordover, Costly Litigation, supra note 25 (which expands Diamond's single activity
accident model to include litigation costs).
230. In other words, the model considers only ex post damage rules. See supra text
accompanying notes 92-93 (discussing the impracticability of ex ante damage rules). In
addition, consistent with Diamond, the possibility of bankruptcy is ignored.
231. See supra note 125.
232. See supra note 126.
233. See supra note 127.
234. See supra note 128.
235. This Article ignores no-fault laws because the concern here is with an optimal
tort system and because no-fault laws do not apply to the serious permanent injuries
considered here. See supra note 29.
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native to the tort system is a system that permits only voluntary
exchanges and that high transaction costs preclude such voluntary exchanges. 2G It is assumed that each individual is entitled
initially to be free from any risk of injury that others engaging
23 7
in the activity create.
IL

THE EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM

Because the text considers whether tort rules for single activity
accidents are Pareto superior to a system that permits only
voluntary exchanges, the Appendix does not examine this issue. 238
Rather, the analysis that follows examines which, if any, of the
standard tort rules are Pareto efficient.
As is explained in the text, to determine which, if any, tort
rules are Pareto efficient, one must first determine the Pareto
efficient equilibrium levels of care-taking and risk spreading.2 9
As the text explains, because the individuals engaged in the
single activity are identically situated, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is determined by finding the equilibrium levels of care
and insurance coverage that maximize the expected utility of an
individual engaged in the activity. 240
As is reflected in Equation (1), following Diamond, the analysis
of efficient equilibria in this Article is limited to the equilibrium
at which all individuals engage in the same behavior; that is,
uniform equilibrium. 241 The efficient uniform equilibrium level of
care, x*, is the level of care taken by everyone that maximizes
the expected utility of each person in equilibrium. 242 The efficient
level of accident insurance coverage, A*, is the level of coverage
that maximizes each individual's expected utility at the efficient
equilibrium level of care. Accordingly, the efficient uniform equilibrium levels of care and accident insurance are the levels of
care, x, and insurance coverage, A, that maximize an individual's
expected utility as given by Equation (1):243

236. The Article assumes that transaction costs are high because otherwise no reason
for the tort system exists; individuals would achieve the efficient solution through
voluntary exchanges. See Coase, supra note 46.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 50.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
241. Diamond, supra note 25, at 114.
242. Id. at 115.
243. The expected utility of each individual at the uniform equilibrium is given by his
utility if uninjured minus his expected accident costs: U,(W,) - np(x,x)[U(W,)-U(W 2)]. This
is equivalent to Equation (1). The term p(x,x) represents the expected number of accidents
(per unit time) between two individuals who are both taking care level x.
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EV(x,A) = (1-np(x,x))U,(W1 ) + np(x,x)U(W 2)

[1]

where

W + b(x) - np(x,x)A
W2-W + b(x) - m + (1-np(x,x))A.
W,

Maximizing Equation (1), we find that the efficient equilibrium
levels of care and insurance are the levels of care, x*, and
insurance coverage, A*, that satisfy Equations (2) and (3):244
[2] b'(x)z = 2np,(x,x)[U(Wi)-U2 (W2 )+Az]

[3]

Ul'(WI) = U 2'(W 2)

where
z - (1-np(x,x))U'(W,) + np(x,x)U 2'(W 2).
The conditions for the Pareto efficient levels of care and
insurance as given by Equations (2) and (3) are similar to those
in the unilateral risk case. Equation (2) implies that here, as in
the case of unilateral risks, care-taking is efficient when each
individual takes the level of care, x*, at which the social marginal
cost of care equals the social marginal benefit of care. 245 We may

more readily see the nature of the social costs and benefits of
care by rewriting Equation (2) to incorporate Equation (3) as
follows:
b'(x)U'(W,) = 2npl(x,x)[Ul(W1 )-U2(W2)+AUI'(W)].

From this equation we see that the social marginal cost of care
is the cost to the individual in question of exercising care,
b'(x)U,'(W). The social marginal benefit of care is the benefit to
everyone engaged in the activity of an increase in the care by
the individual in question. This benefit is composed of both the
benefit to the individual himself of the resulting decrease in his
expected number of accidents, npl(x,x)[UI(W)-U 2 (W 2)+AUI'(W,)],

as well as the benefit to each of the n other individuals of the
resulting reduction in the expected number of accidents between
each of them and the individual in question, np,(x,x)[U(W)U 2 (W

246
2 ) +AUI'(W)].

As for efficient insurance coverage, Equation (3) implies that
the efficient level of coverage, A*, is the level at which the

244. It is assumed that the second-order conditions for x* and A* to be maxima of
Equation (1) hold. This assumption requires that np(x*,x*)U,"(W2*) < (1+np(x*,x*))U,"(W,*).
It also is assumed that the efficient uniform equilibrium is unique.

245. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 115.
246. The term UI(W,)-U 2(W2)+AU,'(W,) represents the cost to the individual of being
injured plus the cost of purchasing insurance. The actual cost to an individual of being
injured is UI(W)-U2(W 2 ). The term AU,'(W,) is the cost to the individual of the insurance
coverage he purchases in order to spread the risk of being injured.
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insured individual's marginal utility of wealth if he is healthy,
U,'(W1 ), equals his marginal utility of wealth should he be injured,
U2'(W2). In other words, to be efficient, insurance coverage must
be such that the utility an individual would derive from the last
dollar of wealth he has available to him is the same whether he
is healthy or injured. This is the standard condition for efficient
insurance coverage. Here, however, as in the case of unilateral
risks, 247 the efficient level of insurance coverage for physical
injuries is a level of coverage that provides less than full compensation for the loss.24 8 It will be shown that even though
efficient coverage is less than full coverage, here, unlike the
unilateral risk case, there is no conflict between efficient caretaking and efficient risk spreading.

III.

THE No-LIABILITY EQUILIBRIUM

Before turning to our consideration of the standard tort rules,
we first consider whether tort liability is necessary by consid247. E.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 9, ch. 9.
248. The proof of this conclusion, which is presented below, is based on the proof
contained in Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 148-50, and depends on the assumption
of this model that health is a normal good. See supra note 114.
Following Cook and Graham, we define R(W) as the maximum amount the individual
would be willing to pay to exchange a certainty of being injured for a certainty of being
uninjured,
[3A] U2(W2 ) = U,[W.-R(W)] = U,[W + m- R(W,)].
The assumption of this model that health is a normal good implies that R'(W) > 0. See
supra note 114. R'(W) > 0 in turn implies that
[3B] U2 '(W2) <U,'[W2 + m- R(W2)]= U,[W,-R(W2)].
See Cook & Graham, supra note 64, at 147.
Now, consider Equation (3B) when the individual has purchased full insurance coverage
A'. Defining full insurance coverage, A', as the amount that equates the total utility in
the injury and no-injury states of the world,
U,[W + b(x)-np(x,x)A] = U2[W +b(x)+(1-np(x,x))A' - m],
Equation [3A] can be rewritten as follows:
U[W21+m-A(W 2')] = U,(W,') = U2(W2,')
where
W'- W, at A = A'
W 2 ' W2 at A = A'.

Given this, R'(W 2) > 0 implies U2'(W2 ) < U,'(W,'). Thus, at A = A', U,'(W) # U'(W),
and therefore full insurance coverage is not efficient. See Cook & Graham, supra note
64.
To determine whether efficient coverage, A*, is less than or greater than full coverage,
A', we consider the impact of a change in insurance coverage on U,'(W,) and U2'(W2). The
total derivatives of U2'(W2) and U,'(W,) when care is efficient and A = A' are:
dU,'(W,)/dA = -np(x*,x*)U,"(W,) > 0
and
dU 2'(W2)/dA = (1-np(x*,x*))U 2"(W2) < 0.
Accordingly, because at A', U2'(W2') < U,'(W,'), to satisfy the requirement of Equation
(3B), A* must be less than A'.
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ering whether Pareto efficiency is possible under a tort rule that
permits individuals to engage in the activity without having to
pay damages for injuries they cause. The uniform equilibrium
249
that results under this rule is called the no-liability equilibrium.
The expected utility of a person who, with all others, may
engage in the activity without having to pay damages for any
injuries that result is given by Equation (4), which describes the
expected utility of someone who must bear the cost of his own,
but not of anyone else's, injuries:
[4] EV(x,A) = (1-np(x,y))U,[W +b(x)-np(x,y)A] +
np(x,y)U2[W + b(x)-m + (1-np(x,y))A].
The no-liability uniform equilibrium occurs at the level of care
and the amount of insurance coverage that maximize each individual's expected utility as given by Equation (4), when everyone
takes the same level of care (i.e., when y = x).250 The no-liability
equilibrium thus occurs at the level of care, x °, and insurance
coverage,
A °, that satisfy Equations (5) and (6), when y equals
251
X:

[5] b'(x)z = np,(x,x)[U(W) - U2(W2 ) + Az]
[6]

UI'(W1 ) = V2'(W2).

A comparison of Equation (6) and Equation (3) reveals that the
condition for the no-liability equilibrium level of insurance is the
same as that for the efficient uniform equilibrium level of insurance: each individual purchases the insurance coverage at which
his marginal utility of wealth is the same whether he is injured

249. Again we restrict the discussion to uniform equilibria. We define the no-liability
equilibrium level of care as the care level, x° ,that a rational utility-maximizing individual
would choose to take when he is not liable for damages and when he believes that all
other individuals also are taking care level x° .Diamond, supra note 25, at 114. This use
of the term "no-liability equilibrium" differs from Diamond's. Diamond used the term "noliability equilibrium" to refer to the equilibrium that results absent liability rules. Id. at
113. When the efficiency criterion employed is the Pareto criterion, such a construction
of the no-liability equilibrium implicitly assumes that individuals are not initially entitled
to be free from the risk in question. Here, it is assumed that individuals are entitled to
be free from the risk in question, with the result that absent liability rules no one can
engage in the activity. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. Thus, here the term
"no-liability equilibrium" refers to the situation in which individuals engage in the activity
but do not pay damages.
250. This analysis of individuals' behavior, and the analysis in the rest of this Article,
assumes that each person takes the behavior of others, as he perceives it, as given and
that each person's expectations about others' behavior are correct. See Diamond, supra
note 25, at 113.
251. It is assumed that the second-order conditions for x° and AO to be maxima of
Equation (4) hold, and that the no-liability equilibrium is unique.
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or uninjured. The actual level of insurance coverage purchased
at the no-liability equilibrium differs from the efficient equilibrium level of coverage, however, because care-taking, and thus
wealth, at the no-liability equilibrium differs from care-taking,
and thus wealth, at the efficient equilibrium.
The text below presents the intuitive explanation of why the
no-liability equilibrium level of care is different from, and in fact
less than, the efficient level of care. 52 The mathematical proof
follows from a comparison of Equations (2) and (5) and is presented
in the footnotes. As Equation (5) reveals, each individual at the
no-liability equilibrium takes the level of care at which his marginal cost of care equals his marginal benefit of care. As Equations (2) and (5) show, the individual's marginal cost of care, b'(x)z,
equals the social marginal cost of care, but because the individual
does not bear the cost of the risks he imposes on others, his
marginal benefit of care, np,(x,x)[U(W 1 ) - U2(W2) + Az], is only half
the social marginal benefit of care, 2np,(x,x)[Ul(W 1 ) - U2(W2) + Az].
As a result, his incentives to take care are inadequate, and he
will exercise less care than is efficient. 2 3 Accordingly, the noliability equilibrium is inefficient.

252. See supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
253. The precise proof that the no-liability equilibrium level of care, x0, is less than
the efficient level of care, x*, proceeds as follows. By definition, each individual's expected
utility at the efficient uniform equilibrium, EV(x*,A*), exceeds his expected utility at the
no-liability equilibrium, EV(xo,Ao). This implies that if care must be increased in order
to move from EV(xo,Ao) to EV(x*,A*), then x* > x 0 . In other words, if dEV/dx > 0 at
(x°,A°), then x* > xo.
The total derivative of each individual's expected utility with respect to x, evaluated
at (x0, AO), is given by:
dEV/dx (at x 0 , Ao) = np,(xo,xo)[U,(W. ° ) - U,(W 10) - Aozo.
Given that np,(xo,xo) < 0, dEV/dx implies that the no-liability equilibrium level of care,
x 0 , is less than the efficient level of care, x*, if U 2(W2° ) - U1(W1° ) - Aoz ° < 0.
It is easily determined that when the no-liability equilibrium level of insurance coverage
is nonnegative, then U,(W0) - U(W, ° ) - Aoz ° < 0. From Equation (6), we know that at the
no-liability equilibrium
UI(W, ° ) = U,I(WO). This in turn implies
that
°
z = U,.(WO) = U2'(W0) __0. Given this, the fact that the no-liability equilibrium level of
insurance coverage, Ao, is less than full coverage, A, see supra note 248, implies that
°
°
U 2 (W2 ) - U 1(W, ) < 0. Thus, whenever the no-liability equilibrium level of insurance coverage is nonnegative, the no-liability equilibrium level of care is less than the efficient
level of care.
In certain circumstances, the no-liability equilibrium level of insurance coverage is
negative, however. See supra note 209. It can be shown that when insurance coverage is
negative, it is possible that U2(W,) - U(W) - Az > 0. It thus might appear that x 0 sometimes exceeds x*. This is not the case, however. Although U2(W.) - U(W,) - AU,'(W,) > 0
is possible, this condition never holds at the no-liability equilibrium. In other words, it is
never the case that U2(W, ° ) - U,(W 1,) - A°U 1 (W1,) > 0. This claim follows from Equation
(5), the first-order condition for the no-liability equilibrium level of care. Equation (5)
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EFFICIENT TORT LIABILITY RULES

We turn now to the issue of Pareto efficient tort liability rules.
Tort rules are efficient if they induce individuals to take the
efficient level of care and to engage in the efficient amount of
risk spreading.254 This Section examines the four standard tort
liability rules255 to see whether they induce Pareto efficient caretaking and risk spreading.
A. Pure Strict Liability
Pure strict liability permits individuals to engage in an activity
provided that each party to an accident pays the other for his
injuries according to an award schedule determined by the damage rules. The model employed here assumes that each party to
an accident suffers the same injury. 256 Under pure strict liability,
therefore, the parties to an accident are reciprocally liable to
each other for the same amount of damages. 257 As a result, when
all other individuals take care level y, the expected liability of
an individual under pure strict liability is
EV(x,A) = (1-np(x,y))U,[W +b(x)-np(x,y)A] +
np(x,y)U 2[W + b(x)-m + (1-np(x,y))A].
Comparing this equation with Equation (4) reveals that an individual's expected utility under a pure strict liability rule is
identical to his expected utility under a no-liability rule. Given
this, the uniform equilibrium under pure strict liability occurs at
the levels of care and insurance coverage that satisfy Equations
(5) and (6). The pure strict liability equilibrium, in other words,
2
occurs at the no-liability equilibrium and is not efficient. 5

implies that at the no-liability equilibrium:
b'(xo)z o = np,(xo,xo)[U,(Wo)-U 2(Wo)+Aozo].
Examining Equation (5) we see that, because b'(xO)zO < 0 and np,(xo,xo) < 0, for Equation
(5) to hold it must be the case that U,(W, )-U(W 2 })+Az0 > 0. Thus, when the no-liability
uniform equilibrium exists, it will always be the case that x0 < x*.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
255. See supra note 33.
256. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
257. The conclusion that the court awards parties identical, offsetting damages flows
from the assumption that damage rules are such that parties with identical injuries
receive identical damage awards. See supra text accompanying note 125.
258. See supra note 253 and text accompanying notes 252-53. Appendix II shows that
even when individuals do not necessarily suffer the same injury, pure strict liability is
inefficient. See supra note 30.
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Negligence-Inclusive Liability Rules

The question arises whether the three remaining liability rules pure negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, and
strict liability with contributory negligence-are Pareto efficient.
Because under each of these rules an individual can dramatically
affect his expected liability by being nonnegligent -that is, by
exercising due care-we refer to these rules as "negligenceinclusive liability rules."
In the case of single activity accidents that result in identical
injuries, the three negligence-inclusive liability rules are identically efficient. This conclusion follows from the fact that the
expected utility of an individual is the same, regardless of which
25 9
of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules is employed.
Equation (7) presents the expected utility of an individual under
each of the negligence-inclusive liability rules. To demonstrate
the generality of the conclusion that an individual's expected
utility is the same under each of the three rules, Equation (7)
abandons the assumption that all other individuals take the same
260
level of care:
[7] EV(x,A) =
n

n

E(1-p(x,yi))U,[W + b(x)-Xp(x,yi)A]
i=1

i=1
n

n

+ Ep(x,yi)g(y)U2[W + b(x)-m + D + (1-2p(x,yi))A]
i=1
n

i=1
n

+ Ep(x,yi)f(yi)U 2[W + b(x)-m + (1-Ep(x,y))A]
i=1

i=1

if the individual takes due care and

259. See infra note 260.
260. The following assumptions form the basis for Equation (7): the collateral source
rule governs; due care for purposes of determining both negligence aid contributory
negligence equals the efficient uniform equilibrium level of care, x*; and people with
identical injuries receive identical damages.
When individuals are identically situated before the accident occurs but may not be
identically situated afterwards in that they may suffer different injuries, then the
individual's expected utility function differs under each of the three negligence-inclusive
liability rules. Even in this situation, however, the same damage rule induces efficient
behavior under each of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules. See supra note 30.
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n

E(1-p(x,yi))U,[W + b(x)-Ep(x,yi)A]
i=1

i=1
n

n

+ Ep(x,yi)g(yi) U2[W + b(x)-m + (1-Ep(x,y))A]
i=1

i=1

n

n

+ -p(x,yi)f(yi) U 2[W + b(x)-m + (1-Ep(x,yj))A-D]
i=1

i=1

otherwise, where yj is the level of care taken by the ith of the n
other individuals (1 _<i :5 n); f(yi) is a function that selects for
those of the other n individuals who are not negligent,
f(y) - 1 if y3 > x*
0 if Yj < x*
and g(yi) = 1-f(y,) is the function that selects for those of the other
2 61
n individuals who are negligent.
Because an individual's expected utility function is the same
under each of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules, differentiating between the three rules to determine whether any
of them are Pareto efficient is unnecessary; if any one of them
is efficient, they all are efficient. 262 What remains to be determined is whether all three rules are identically Pareto efficient
or identically inefficient. This determination depends on whether
these rules produce a uniform equilibrium such that individuals
take the efficient level of care and engage in efficient risk
spreading.
Under the negligence-inclusive liability rules, two potential
uniform equilibria exist. The first, the negligent uniform equilibrium, occurs when all individuals are negligent. The second, the
nonnegligent uniform equilibrium, occurs when each individual
exercises care greater than, or equal to, due care.

261. Those familiar with Diamond's model of single activity accidents will observe that
Diamond, in representing the individual's expected utility function under a negligence
with contributory negligence liability rule, integrated the "distribution" n(y) of individuals
taking care level y over y. Diamond, supra note 25, at 117. In Equation (7), Diamond's
integrals have been replaced with summations because this Article, like Diamond's model,
assumes the existence of a finite number of individuals. Accordingly, the "distribution"
function n(y) employed by Diamond is zero almost everywhere, and thus the integral of
n(y) over the range y=0 to y=1 is zero. Therefore, integrating over the "distribution"
n(y) as Diamond did will not yield the individual's expected utility. To obtain the
individual's expected utility when the number of individuals is finite it is necessary to
sum, as is done here, over the level of care taken by the individuals.
262. See supra note 179.
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Consider, first, the negligent uniform equilibrium. Under the
negligence-inclusive liability rules, when both parties to an accident are negligent, each is liable to the other for damages.
Because the parties suffer identical injuries, however, the damages each individual owes equal those he is entitled to receive.
Thus, damages owed and received net to zero. Equation (8)
presents each individual's expected utility when everyone is
negligent:
[8] EV(x,A) = (1-np(x,y))U,(W 1) + np(x,y)U2 (W2 ).
The negligent uniform equilibrium thus occurs at the levels of
care and insurance that maximize Equation (8), when all individuals take the same level of care.
Equation (8) is identical to Equation (4), the individual's expected utility in the absence of liability. Equation (8), therefore,
is maximized at the levels of care and insurance coverarge that
satisfy Equations (5) and (6): that is, at the no-liability equilibrium
levels of care and insurance, xo, A ° . The negligent uniform
26 3
equilibrium accordingly is inefficient.
As the negligent uniform equilibrium is never efficient, the
efficiency of the negligence-inclusive liability rules depends on
whether the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium is efficient. Under
each of the three negligence-inclusive liability rules, when all
individuals are nonnegligent, no one either receives or pays net
damages 64 The nonnegligent uniform equilibrium thus occurs at
the levels of care and insurance that maximize Equation (9), when
everyone exercises the same level of care:
[9] EV(x,A) = (1-np(x,y))U(W,) + np(x,y)U 2(W2 ) + X(x-x*),
where Equation (9) incorporates the condition that each individual
takes due care (i.e., that x _>x*).
Maximizing Equation (9) when all individuals take the same
level of care yields the following three conditions that determine
the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium levels of care and insurance:

[10]

265

U1 '(W1 ) = U21(W2)

263. See supra note 253 and text accompanying notes 252-53.
264. Under both pure negligence and negligence with contributory negligence, no one
is liable when both parties to an accident take due care; under strict liability with
contributory negligence, each party is liable to the other but the damages owed and
received net to zero.
265. See generally E. SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS 374-77 (1978) (describing
the solution to constrained maximization problems, such as this one).
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[11]

b'(x)z - np,(x,x)[U2 (W2 )-Ul(W,)-Az] + X - 0
[12] x-x* _ 0;X = 0 if x-x* >0,
where X, the Lagrange multiplier, is used to incorporate the
constraint that care-taking at the nonnegligent equilibrium must
266
equal or exceed due care.

Because the no-liability equilibrium level of care is less than
the efficient equilibrium level of care

(Xo <

x*), 267 we see from

Equation (11) that the constraint that care must equal or exceed
due care is binding. Given this, Equations (11) and (12) imply that
X > 0 and thus that the nonnegligent equilibrium level of care
equals the efficient equilibrium level of care. In other words,
individuals at the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium take the
efficient level of care. A comparison of Equation (10) and Equation
(3) reveals that because care-taking is efficient, risk spreading is
also efficient, and that individuals at the nonnegligent equilibrium
purchase insurance coverage of A*. Thus, if it is possible to
induce individuals to be nonnegligent, the resulting uniform equilibrium will occur at the efficient levels of care and insurance.
The possibility accordingly exists that the three negligence-inclusive liability rules are efficient.
C. Efficient Damage Rules
To realize this possibility of efficiency, more is needed than
efficient liability rules; damage rules also must be efficient. Efficient damage rules are those rules that induce an equilibrium
at which all individuals take the efficient level of care and engage
efficiently in risk spreading. This Appendix previously showed
that the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium is efficient and the
negligent uniform equilibrium is not efficient. To induce efficient
behavior, therefore, damages must preclude the equilibrium at
which all parties are negligent and induce an equilibrium at the
nonnegligent uniform equilibrium.
As the text explains, the requirement that damages preclude
the negligent equilibrium and induce the nonnegligent equilibrium
establishes two conditions for efficient damage rules. To preclude

266. See generally A. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
376-79 (1974) (describing the essentials of the Lagrange-multiplier method of solving
constrained maximization problems); E. SILBERBERG, supra note 265, ch. 12 (describing
the essentials of the Lagrange-multiplier method of solving constrained maximization
problems).
267. See supra note 253 text accompanying notes 252-53.
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the negligent equilibrium, damages must be such that an individual who thinks that everyone else is being negligent will nevertheless find it in his own best interests to exercise due care. To
induce the nonnegligent equilibrium, damages must be such that
an individual who thinks that everyone else is being nonnegligent
will himself choose to be nonnegligent.
This Appendix previously showed that the negligent uniform
equilibrium occurs at the no-liability uniform equilibrium. Accordingly, to satisfy the first condition, damages must be such
that an individual who believes that others are taking the noliability equilibrium level of care, x 0 , will himself elect to take
due care, x*. In other words, damages must equal or exceed the
amount, Dr, that satisfies Equation (13):
[13] EV(x*,A; y=xo) = EV(xo,Ao; y=xo)
where
EV(x*,A; y=xo) = (1-np(x*,xo))U,[W+b(x*)-np(x*,xo)A] +
np(x*,xo)U[W + b(x*)-m + (1-np(x*,xo))A + Dr]
is the individual's expected utility under a negligence-inclusive
liability rule when he takes level of care x*, purchases insurance
A, and when all other individuals take level of care x 0 (i.e.,
y = x0); where A is the level of insurance coverage that maximizes EV(x*,A; y=x0); and where
EV(xO,A°; y=x ° ) = (1-np(xO,xo))U,(W, ° ) + np(xO,xo)U(W 2 0)
is the individual's expected utility at the no-liability uniform
equilibrium.
To satisfy the second condition for efficient damages, damages
must induce the nonnegligent uniform equilibrium, which occurs
at the efficient levels of care and insurance coverage. To satisfy
this condition, damages must be such that an individual who
believes that everyone else is taking due care will himself decide
to take due care. In other words, damages must equal or exceed
the amount, DP, that satisfies Equation (14):

[14] EV(x*,A*; y=x*)

=

EV(xn,In; y=x*)

where
EV(x*,A*; y=x*) = (1-np(x*,x*))U,(W,*) + np(x*,x*)U2 (W2 *)
is the individual's expected utility under a negligence-inclusive
liability rule at the efficient uniform equilibrium;
and
EV(xn, In; y = x*) = (1-np(xn,x*))U1[W + b(Xn)-np(Xn,x*)In] +
np(xnx*)U,[W + b(xn)-m + (1-np(xn,x*))I-Dp]
is the individual's expected utility under a negligence-inclusive
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liability rule when all other individuals take due care, but the
individual in question takes care xn < x* and purchases insurance
coverage of In, where x" < x* is the level of care, and I n is the
amount of accident and liability insurance that maximizes
268
EV(x,I; y = x*).
To be efficient, damage rules must satisfy both Equations (13)
and (14). Efficient damage awards therefore include all awards
that equal or exceed the greater of Dr or DP. In other words,
under each of the negligence-inclusive liability rules, all damage
awards greater than or equal to D*, where
[15] D* = Max [Dr,DP],
will induce individuals to exercise the efficient level of care and
269
consequently to purchase the efficient amount of insurance.
An examination of Equations (13)-(15) reveals that minimum
efficient damages are based on each individual's costs of careon the amount needed to induce him to be nonnegligent-and
not on the costs of the injury. As a result, full compensation
damages are not necessary for efficiency; in fact, the full compensation value of the injury (which is the C such that
U(W 1 ) = U 2(W2 + C)) does not even enter into the analysis.
The following example reveals the irrelevance of the full compensation value of the injury to the measure of efficient damages.
Consider the case in which a serious permanent injury reduces
the victim's total utility of wealth but does not affect his marginal
utility of wealth. In other words, assume that U1 '(W)= U2(W),
for all W. In this case, Equation (15) implies that damages are
guaranteed to be efficient if they satisfy Equation (16):270

268. In other words, I is such that U,'[(W+b(x")-np(x",x*)I] = U!"[W+b(x")-m+
(1-np(x,,x*))In-Dp].
269. The conclusion that the same damage rule induces efficiency under each of the
negligence-inclusive liability rules holds even when individuals are identically situated ex
ante but may not be identically situated ex post in that they may suffer different injuries.
See supra note 30.
270. When U,'(W) = U2'(W) for all W, we can define U,(W) = U2(W) + k, where k > 0

and is not measured in monetary terms. In this situation, the requirement of efficient
insurance that U,'(W,) = U2'(W 2) implies that insurance coverage will be such that the
individual's wealth in the healthy and injured states of the world are equal, that is,
W, = W,. Equations (13) and (14) can now be rewritten as Equations (13a) and (14a):
[13a] U,[W + b(x*)-np(x*,xo)(m-Di]- np(x*,x°)k = U,[W + b(xo)-np(xo,xo)m] - np(xo,xok
[14a] U,[W + b(x*)-np(x*,x*)mI - np(x*,x*)k = U,[W + b(x-np(xn,x*}(m +Dp)] - np(xo,x*)k.
Because np(x*,xo)k < np(x°,xo)k, damages are guaranteed to exceed those that satisfy
Equation (13a) and therefore are guaranteed to satisfy the first requirement for efficient
damages if damages equal
b(xO)-b(x*).
np(x*,x)
Because np(x*,x*)k < np(x",x*)k, damages are guaranteed to exceed those that satisfy
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D* > MaxI

b(xn)-b(x*), b(xo)-b(x*)
np(xn,x*)

np(xo,x*)

Damages as determined by Equation (16) are clearly based on
the individual's cost of care function, b(x), and not on the full
compensation value of the loss, C. In fact, calculating efficient
damages in this case does not require knowledge of the full
compensation value of the injury.
The fact that single activity accidents do not require full
compensation damages, as does the unilateral risk case, leads to
a number of other essential differences between efficient damages
in the two situations. Section III, part E of the text discusses in
detail these differences between the conclusions of the orthodox
model and those of the single activity accident model.

Equation (14a) and therefore are guaranteed to satisfy the second requirement for efficient
damages if damages equal
b~x-b(x*),
np(xn,x*)
where x- is defined as in the text. Damages therefore are guaranteed to be efficient if
they equal the larger of
b(x }-b(x*).
or
b(xo°}b(x*)
np(xo,x*)
np(x*,xo)
Which of these is larger cannot be determined absent additional restrictions.

